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COURT TERM CONCENTRATED ON HARASSMENT, INDIVIDUAL
The Arizona Republic
June 28, 1998
By Aaron Epstein, Knight Ridder Newspapers
Without sex, the Supreme Court term that ended Friday would have been dull and of little importance
to most Americans.
But the moderately conservative court delved into the issue of harassment between- and within-
the sexes as never before, producing a record number of significant rulings on one of the most
inflammatory and divisive topics of the decade.
"It is now well recognized that hostile-environment sexual harassment by supervisors (and, for that
matter, co-employees) is a persistent problem in the workplace," Justice David Souter observed in one
of the high court's four sexual harassment decisions of the
term.
It is not customary for this court, composed as it is of a majority ot'justices appointed by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, to expand the rights of individuals. But in three decisions on sexual
harassment on the job and one on the rights of the disabled, they did just that.
In most cases, though, the court preserved the status quo, as it did in striking down the line-item veto,
finding the lie detector still too unreliable for courtrooms, blocking suits
arising from high-speed police pursuits and refusing independent counsel Kenneth Starr's request for a
new exception- after the client's death- to the attorney-client privilege.
Criminal defendants lost two of every three cases, and Indians lost four of five.
But in the area of sexual harassment, the justices enlarged the individual rights of workers, male and
female.
First, in a unanimous opinion, the justices authorized same-sex lawsuits, saying that harassment can
be illegal even when men abuse men or women mistreat women.
Congress probably didn't have male-on-male sexual harassment in mind when it wrote the law that
bars employment discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
But Justice Antonin Scalia, who rarely is willing to extend the reach of a statute, explained for the
court that laws "often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils."
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On Friday, in two 7-2 decisions, the court enlarged the rights of victimized employees to win damages
from their employers for sexual mistreatment by supervisors. It was a new application of the ancient rule
that masters are legally responsible for the acts of servants, unless the servants veer off "on a frolic of
their own."
As a result, employees can file harassment suits even if they haven't been fired, demoted, transferred
to some undesirable outpost or suffered some other tangible job detriment.
But on this court, majorities can't be created by taking extreme positions, and so the court devised
a defense for employers in suits filed by employees who haven't suffered adverse job
consequences. Employers can win such suits if they have an effective anti-harassment policy and
complaint procedure that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
The defense is likely to motivate employers to crack down on harassment if they haven't done so
already.
For parents of students who are victims of sexual harassment by teachers or other school personnel,
the news was not good.
In a 5-4 decision last week, the court's conservatives ruled that students can't win damages from
school districts unless they can jump a high legal hurdle: produce proof that some district
official knew of the misconduct but did nothing about it.
To some critics, there is a double standard here. The law, as handed down by the Supreme Court,
gives harassed workers a right to sue that it denies to more vulnerable student-victims.
The conservatives' explanation: The law barring sex discrimination in schools that received federal
funds, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, provides narrower protections than the civil rights
law governing bias in employment, Title VII.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor described Title IX as an administrative law designed primarily to inform
school officials of violations, give them a chance to correct the problems and withdraw federal funds if
they don't.
The split in the school case, in which a teacher sexually exploited a 15-year-old girl, was ideologically
pure.
Five conservatives- Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Scalia, Clarence Thomas, O'Connor and
Anthony Kennedy- voted to limit the liability of the school districts.
The four liberals- John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Souter- sided with
the girl and her parents.
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"Kennedy is still the most critical vote on the court in close cases," said Torn Goldstein, a Washington
lawyer who tracks the alignments of the Supreme Court justices. "He voted in dissent only six times
during the term."
That means, Goldstein said, that Kennedy was in the majority in 85 of the court's 91 decided cases
in 1997-98, more than any other justice.
The next-most important justices in close closes, Goldstein said, were O'Connor and, somewhat
surprisingly, Rehnquist. They dissented 11 times each. "The chief was more in the middle of the court
than he has been in the past," Goldstein said.
But the biggest change in alignments during the term, he said, was that Scalia and Thomas, the court's
rarely divided arch-conservatives, parted ways in close cases.
Goldstein said they had always voted together in 5-4 cases in the past, but this term they voted
differently in four of them. The cases concerned guns, excessive fines, deportation and double jeopardy.
In one of those cases, Thomas joined the liberals for the first time, in a 5-4 case in which he wrote a
majority opinion that struck down a government-proposed forfeiture as excessive for the first time in the
court's history.
Still, Scalia and Thomas agreed completely or partly 88 percent of the time, second only to the 90
percent pairing of Kennedy and Rehnquist.
Copyright 1998 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
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THE SUPREME COURT: THE WORKPLACE;
COURT SPELLS OUT RULES FOR FINDING SEX HARASSMENT
The New York Times
June 27, 1998, Page Al
By Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court clarified the law on sexual harassment in the workplace today, making some
lawsuits against employers easier to win while limiting the legal exposure of companies that have
effective anti-harassment policies in place.
The pair of 7-to-2 decisions, issued on the final day of the Court's term, cut through a thicket of
confusing and contradictory lower-court rulings that had grown up in the 12 years since the Justices first
ruled that sexual harassment was a form of employment discrimination.
Among the Court's holdings was that an employee who resists a supervisor's advances need not have
suffered a tangible job detriment, like dismissal or loss of a promotion, to be able to pursue a lawsuit
against the company. But such a suit cannot succeed, the Court said, if the company has an anti-
narassment policy with an effective complaint procedure in place and the employee has unreasonably
failed to use it.
The rulings won praise across a broad spectrum of both management and civil rights groups for
bringing coherence to the law and providing incentives for preventing harassment and dealing promptly
with problems.
"It's a win-win for employers and for all the women of America," Kathy Rodgers, executive director
of the National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, said in a comment virtually
echoed by a lawyer for the United States Chamber of Commerce.
"The Court responded to our cries in the wilderness for clear, bright-line standards so employers will
know what to do," Robin Conrad, senior vice president of the chamber's legal arm, said in an interview.
Ms. Conrad called the rulings "fair and reasonable."
Taken together, the two decisions had an almost legislative sweep, establishing clearly defined rights
and responsibilities for companies and their employees. Both were interpretations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace.
234
One of the decisions awarded judgment to a former lifeguard who sued the City of Boca Raton, Fla.,
for failing to protect her from years of harassment by her supervisors. The other made a large corporate
employer presumptively liable for a supervisor's harassment of a lower-level employee- although the
woman in fact received a promotion- but gave the company a new chance to show in its defense that
it had a good complaint policy in place that the plaintiff did not use.
This second case, Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, No. 97-569, was being closely scrutinized
today as offering a potential clue to the future of the Paula Corbin Jones sexual harassment lawsuit
against President Clinton. A Federal district judge in Little Rock, Ark., dismissed that suit in April, based
in part on precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which covers Little
Rock, that made proof of a "tangible job detriment" a necessary element of a harassment claim of the type
Ms. Jones brought against Mr. Clinton. She has appealed to the Eighth Circuit seeking reinstatement of
her lawsuit.
While the decision today invalidated the circuit's precedent, the ruling will not necessarily affect the
outcome of Ms. Jones's appeal. In dismissing the suit, Judge Susan Webber Wright found that Ms. Jones
could not prevail under any legal standard because she had offered no evidence that Mr. Clinton had
threatened her with job-related consequences.
The decisions today in both the Burlington Industries case and the lifeguard's lawsuit, Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, No. 97-282, were supported by the same group of Justices. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
wrote the Burlington decision, and Justice David H. Souter wrote the Boca Raton decision. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer also voted in both majorities. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented
in both cases.
Earlier Supreme Court decisions had concerned themselves principally with defining sexual
harassment and had spoken only vaguely on the crucial question of how an employee, experiencing
harassment by a supervisor, can make the company legally responsible. Without employer liability, there
is no action under Title VII, which refers to the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment."
Previous decisions had established that an employee who suffered a job-related injury from resisting
a supervisor's "quid pro quo" demand for sexual favors had a legal cause of action against the employer,
and that rule was reinforced today.
"A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act," Justice
Kennedy said in the Burlington case.
But the law was much less clear in two other situations: when an employee was forced to endure a
sexually hostile environment, as in the Boca Raton case, where no specific demand was made but where
unwanted touching and crude remarks were pervasive over a long period, and when demands were
resisted but no job detriment ensued, as in the Burlington case.
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The lower Federal courts had become entangled in a maze of inquiries about whether supervisors in
these situations could be described as acting within the scope of their official authority or, if not, whether
the employer could be held responsible for a supervisor's unauthorized search for personal gratification.
In the Boca Raton case, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the I Ith Circuit, in Atlanta,
had ruled that the two supervisory lifeguards who harassed Beth Ann Faragher were not acting within
the scope of their employment and that the city thus was not responsible for their actions.
Further adding to the confusion, the lower courts disagreed on whether to hold an employer
responsible only if high-level officials "knew or should have known" of the harassment- a negligence
standard that is difficult for plaintiffs to meet- and also on the extent to which a published anti-
harassment policy should immunize a company from liability.
In their opinions today, Justices Souter and Kennedy said the effort to draw neat boundaries around
categories of harassment or aspects of supervisors' behavior had proven unsuccessful. The distinction
between a "quid pro quo" case and a "hostile work environment" case was of "limited utility," Justice
Kennedy said. He said it was necessary to step back and examine the "basic policies" underlying Title
VII, which he said included "encouraging forethought by employers" as well as actions by employees to
mitigate harm to themselves.
As a result, both decisions incorporated an identical, page-long set of rules under which harassment
cases are to proceed. The rules establish the following:
* Employers are responsible for harassment engaged in by their supervisory employees.
* When the harassment results in "a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion or
undesirable reassignment," the employer's liability is absolute.
* When there has been no tangible action, an employer can defend itself if it can prove two things:
first, that it has taken "reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior," such as by adopting an effective policy with a complaint procedure, and second, that
the employee "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities" provided.
Applying this framework in the Burlington case, the Court said that the plaintiff, Kimberly Ellerth,
should have a chance at trial to prove her case and that, at the same time, the company should have the
chance to assert a defense. The decision affirmed a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, which had found Ms. Ellerth entitled to a trial.
In a dissenting opinion in the Burlington case, Justice Thomas said employers should face liability only
for their own negligence. His opinion, which Justice Scalia also signed, accused the majority of "willful
policymaking, pure and simple," under which "employer liability very well may be the rule."
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Several lawyers said today that future cases would be needed to elaborate on what employers need
to do to make their anti-harassment policies effective. Eric Schnapper, a civil rights expert at the
University of Washington Law School, said the greatest impact of the rulings would be to change the
employer's incentive system from one of "don't ask, don't tell to having proven and effective policies in
place."
Copyright # 1998 by The New York Times.
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HIGH COURT DRAWS LINE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT;
EMPLOYERS HELD LIABLE; SUIT THRESHOLD EASED
The Washington Post
June 27, 1998
By Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
Employers are responsible for the sexual misconduct of supervisors, even if they knew nothing about
the behavior, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday. The decision sets a strict new standard for harassment
on the job and raises the stakes for companies accused of permitting it in their workplaces.
By 7-to-2 votes in a pair of cases on the last day of the term, the justices made clear that workers
need no longer prove that an employer knew or should have known about the sexual harassment and
failed to stop it. And victims do not necessarily have to show that they lost out on a promotion or were
fired because they spurned a boss's sexual advances, if the boss's threats and other abuse were severe or
pervasive, that's enough basis for a lawsuit.
Yesterday's twin rulings were among the most awaited in a term full of controversial decisions, from
one making clear the balance of spending power between Congress and the president to another ensuring
that people with the AIDS virus are protected by disabilities law.
Yet no other term in history has produced so many rulings on the topic of sexual harassment. And
the combined effect of those decisions yielded an unequivocal message to American business: Sexual
misconduct is to be taken seriously and any company that doesn't can
expect to pay a price.
"It is by now well recognized that . sexual harassment by supervisors (and, for that matter, co-
employees) is a persistent problem in the workplace," Justice David H. Souter wrote in one of the rulings,
adding that an employer's burden of preventing harassment is "one of the costs of doing business."
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia joined in a strong dissent.
The high court's focus on sexual harassment comes at a time when the subject is at the forefront of
public awareness, ignited most recently by the charges of President Clinton accuser Paula Jones and
reinforced by record court settlements, such as the $34 million Mitsubishi Motors payment to female
workers at its Illinois factory.
The number of sexual harassment claims has been soaring for nearly a decade, since 1991, when Anita
Hill charged that she had been harassed by Justice Thomas while he was chairman of the agency that
investigates harassment claims. That same year, Congress first allowed money damages for harassment
victims.
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In the intervening years, the financial stakes have risen significantly for companies, and yesterday's
rulings could prove to be another benchmark.
Women's rights advocates praised the decisions for giving employers the responsibility for eliminating
harassment. "The court said the 'hear no evil, see no evil' defense won't work," said Kathy Rodgers,
executive director for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, which represented a former
lifeguard who sued the city of Boca Raton, Fla., for the harassment she endured.
Business groups, while protesting portions of the decisions, said they were gratified- after years of
conflicting lower court standards- to get clear guidelines.
Ann Elizabeth Reesman of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, which sided with Boca Raton,
said the court decisions "support the employer who takes proactive steps to fight sexual harassment, such
as with an accessible complaint procedure."
The court ruled that employers can be held outright responsible for any harassment by a supervisor
that leads to a tangible job consequence. But the justices established a two-part test for determining
liability when the harasser warned a victim of job consequences for refusing to submit, but then never
carried out the threat.
In those cases, the majority said an employer would have to show that it used "reasonable care" to
prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior. And second, it must show that the worker
unreasonably failed to prevent or correct the harm, for example, by complaining to officials.
In the Boca Raton case, Beth Ann Faragher was a lifeguard who said two of her supervisors harassed
her by slapping her on the rear, tackling her to the ground and making vulgar comments. She never
complained to management, but sued for harassment.
A federal district court ruled that the harassment was sufficiently serious and met the test for
discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But a federal appeals court reversed the
ruling, saying an employer was liable only if it had given the supervisor authority to harass. Other
appeals courts had ruled that employers would be liable if they were negligent in permitting the
supervisor's conduct to occur.
Yesterday, in setting a new national standard, the Supreme Court lowered the bar for workers and
said an employer is responsible for supervisors' misconduct in situations such as Faragher's that constitute
what is known as a "hostile work environment," or for misconduct carried out by co-workers and
supervisors that is severe or pervasive.
Lower courts already had been in virtual agreement that employers are automatically liable for
supervisor harassment known as "quid pro quo," in which a boss typically links requests for sexual favors
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with some job consequence. Yesterday, the justices said employer liability should be the same for the
two kinds of cases, partly because employers should anticipate such misconduct and try to prevent it.
"When a person with supervisory authority discriminates , his actions necessarily draw upon his
superior position over the people who report to him," Souter wrote for the majority in Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, adding that "an employee generally cannot check
a supervisor's abusive conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-worker. When a
fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be
difficult to offer such responses to a supervisor. . . "
In their dissent, Thomas and Scalia said employers should be liable only if the employer was negligent
in letting the harassment occur. They complained that the new rule was "a whole-cloth creation."
The companion case was first filed by Kimberly Ellerth, a marketing representative for Burlington
Industries in Chicago. A boss told her suggestively, "I could make your job very hard or very easy,"
asked her to wear shorter skirts and touched her inappropriately. Ellerth did not submit and did not lose
her job or a promotion. But after she quit she sued.
In an opinion by Anthony M. Kennedy, the court ruled that harassment victims need not show an
obvious job consequence. But it said in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth that if there is no clear job loss,
the employer can overcome liability by showing that it took reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassment and that the employee herself failed to take reasonable steps to either prevent or stop the
harassment.
Although the abuse both women endured was similar in some respects- both said bosses touched
them inappropriately, for example, and neither complained- each came to the court by different avenues
and presented separate legal questions. In the end, the justices set aside the differences to broadly
address an employer liability.
To many women's rights advocates, the decisions combined with a ruling on Monday set up an unfair
double-standard, allowing adult workers to sue for harassment more readily than students- who
presumably would need more protection.
The court said a school district could not be liable for harassment unless it knew of the abuse and was
deliberately indifferent to it. That narrow majority justified the standard by
noting that, unlike Title VII's outright prohibition on harassment, the law forbidding sex discrimination
at schools that receive federal funds (known as Title IX) is based on the idea that school officials will be
notified of problems and allowed to try to correct them.
Copyright @ 1998 by The Washington Times.
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SEX HARASSMENT AND DOUBLE STANDARDS
The New York Times
June 30, 1998
Section A; Page 23, Column 1; Editorial Desk
By Marcia D. Greenberger and Verna L. Williams
When is a victim of sexual harassment not a victim of sexual harassment? When the victim is a
student, according to several decisions by the Supreme Court this term. Indeed, the Court's rulings
inadvertently created two classes of citizens: employees, who are protected from sexual harassment, and
students, who are not.
In a victory for employees, the Court, in a pair of 7-to-2 decisions, ruled that employers could be held
financially responsible when supervisors sexually harassed workers, whether or not the employer actually
knew about the harassment.
Indeed, the Court ruled that under Title VII, the Federal law prohibiting workplace discrimination,
an employee who resisted a supervisor's advances need not have suffered any kind of tangible loss, like
dismissal or loss of a promotion, to be able to file a lawsuit against her company. Instead, when the
harassment does not result in any loss, but causes emotional distress or other injury, then the employer
must show that it had strong policies and procedures in place, that employees were informed about these
policies and that the employee had unreasonably failed to use it.
Under this sound decision, if a teacher harasses an assistant, and the school system fails to respond,
then it can be held liable.
But what happens to a student harassed by a teacher? In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, the Court ruled 5 to 4 that schools or colleges do not have to pay damages for harassment of
a student by a teacher unless officials specifically knew about the misconduct and responded with
"deliberate indifference." It does not matter whether the school system had any policies or procedures
in place or whether it did anything at all to combat harassment.
This decision creates an incentive for school officials to turn their backs on the most egregious
instances of harassment like sexual assault. Officials need only insulate themselves from being informed
and claim ignorance.
Why would the Court make this distinction between students and employees? Students fall under
Title IX, the Federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in education. Title IX, unlike Title VII, has
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no specific language allowing students to sue and win damages from lawsuits- even though the Court
had previously ruled that Congress intended such remedies.
The majority instead said that students were covered by another remedy under Title IX: schools can
be sanctioned by the Education Department, which is authorized to investigate sexual harassment
complaints and, if justified, to halt Federal financing if a school persists in allowing such harassment.
Thanks to the Education Department's efforts, many schools have complied with Title IX. But this
cannot be the only remedy. The Government has limited resources and many civil rights obligations
extending far beyond harassment. It cannot possibly pursue every harassment complaint. And even if
the Government investigates a complaint- and a school adopts procedures to insure that complaints are
addressed promptly- that does little to compensate a student for the injury he or she suffered.
Now, the Government's job might be even harder, since the Court's decision has created a financial
incentive for schools to hide harassment. Many schools will wait to be caught before coming into
compliance with the law.
The Supreme Court has ruled, and now Congress must step in. Working with the Clinton
Administration, it should define Title IX as explicitly allowing students who have been harassed to sue
their schools and to win damages. Justice requires no less.
Copyright 0 1998 by The New York Times.
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DISABILITY LAW COVERS H.I.V., JUSTICES HOLD;
5-4 Ruling Gives Protection Before AIDS Develops
The Washington Post
June 26, 1998, Pg. AO1
By Joan Biskupic; Amy Goldstein, Washington Post Staff Writers
Americans with the AIDS virus won an important victory yesterday in their struggle for recognition,
as the Supreme Court made clear for the first time that they are protected from discrimination under the
nation's disabilities law from the moment they become infected.
In a closely divided, 5 to 4 decision, the court ruled that all people who are HIV-positive, even those
with no overt symptoms of the deadly disease, fall within the shelter of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the landmark federal law that prohibits discrimination in jobs, housing, medical care and other places
that serve the public.
The decision represents the high court's first ruling on an issue related to AIDS and its first major
interpretation of the 1990 disabilities law. Influential as it may prove in the lives of people with H1V, the
opinion could have an even more far-reaching effect by broadening the grounds on which Americans may
claim to be disabled, according to legal experts familiar with the case.
Seventeen years into the AIDS epidemic in the United States, the decision on HIV, coming from a
generally conservative court, is a striking mixture of compassion and precise clinical understanding about
a disease that often has been highly stigmatizing.
"It reflects that this country has come a long way from moving fi-om simple fear of this disease to a
more realistic understanding," said Chai Feldblum, a Georgetown University law professor who filed a
brief on behalf of AIDS activists, gay rights advocates and other ciil rights organizations.
AIDS activists predicted yesterday that the decision, involving a Maine woman whose dentist refused
to fill her cavity unless she paid to have it done in a hospital, could have a beneficial effect on public
health. Some predicted, for example, that it could encourage more people to get tested for the disease,
secure in the knowledge that, even if they turn out to be HIV-positive, they no longer risk losing their
jobs, homes or medical care.
Some activists said the decision also may provide them greater leverage in trying to persuade the
federal government to enable HIV-infected people to qualify for Medicaid, the government health
insurance program for the poor. Right now, only people with full-blown AIDS are covered. But if the
definition of disability under that law were changed to include those who are simply HIV-positive, it
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could enable more people to afford new classes of medications that can help many remain healthier for
a longer period.
Between 400,000 and 650,000 Americans are infected with the human iinmunodeficiency virus (HIV),
but are not sick enough to qualify as having AIDS, according to the most recent estimates of the federal
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It is unclear how many of those people are symptom-free
-- the group directly affected by the court's ruling.
Until now, lower courts have consistently held that the disabilities act covered people with full-blown
AIDS. As a result, coverage for that group was not in dispute. What the high court did yesterday, in
Bragdon v. Abbott, was establish that Sidney Abbott was covered, too, even though she had no outward
evidence of her infection. The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual."
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, was pivotal to the case's outcome,
siding with the court's four more liberal members. He said it was a "misnomer" to refer to HIV as
asymptomatic even in its early stages.
"In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected person's white blood
cells and the severity of the disease," Kennedy wrote, "we hold it is an impairment from the moment of
the infection."
Kennedy went on to say that Abbott's attorney, Bennett H. Klein, was correct in saying his client was
impaired on the grounds that she could not, in good conscience, reproduce because she might transmit
the virus to a fetus. "Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process
itself," Kennedy said. "Conception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim but, without
doubt, are dangerous to the public health."
In deciding that reproduction is grounds for a disability- and thus may not be discriminated against-
the court may have made it easier for women to win insurance coverage for birth control or treatment
for infertility, said Simon Heller, litigation director for the New York-based Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy.
"It's anybody's guess how far [employers] can be pushed," said Ann Reesman, a spokeswoman for
the Equal Employment Advisory Council, a group of 300 large businesses that sided with dentist Randon
Bragdon in the case. She cited the recent example of a television station news anchor who had contended
that she ought to be let out of broadcasts that conflicted with her fertility treatments. "You can't exactly
move the news," Reesman said.
Bragdon, who refused to fill Abbott's cavity in his office in 1994, had argued that the ADA was
intended to apply to impairments of more routine activities, such as one's ability to see, breathe or walk.
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John McCarthy, Bragdon's attorney, had also argued that his client could legally refuse to treat Abbott
under a provision of the ADA that allows health care providers to turn patients away if treating them
posed a risk to the doctor's health. The court said Bragdon must return to lower courts if he wants to
prove he faced such a risk.
The court's decision ratified the long-standing position of the Justice Department, which has regarded
the AIDS virus, even among people without symptoms, as grounds for discrimination complaints under
disability law. But relatively few people have pursued such cases. The department's civil rights office
currently has 67 active cases involving discrimination complaints by HIV-infected people, 15 of them
resembling Abbott's case in that they involved denial of health care services.
But despite the Justice Department's position, discrimination has persisted. In one recent instance, a
Beloit, Wis., day-care center refused to accept a 4-year-old boy who was HIV-infected but had no
symptoms. In another case, a professor at Northeastern University in Boston went to court, contending
that he had been denied tenure because he, too, was HIV-positive.
By cementing that the ADA applies in such cases, yesterday's decision is "the most important legal
victory for people with HIV in the history of the epidemic," said Daniel Zingale, executive director of
AIDS Action, a leading advocacy group.
Dissenting justices said that a person's claim of a disability should be evaluated on an individual basis
and that Abbott had not shown she was impaired in a major life activity. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, said reproduction does not rise to
the level of major daily activities that Congress had intended to be included under the ADA.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately that "the act of giving birth to a child, while a very
important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the representative major life
activities of all persons."
But Georgetown's Feldblum praised the majority, saying "there is now a confluence of law and
medicine that can be very powerful."
Copyright 0 1998 by The Washington Post.
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DISABILITY OF LOGIC
The Recorder
July 15, 1998, Pg. 5
By Chai Feldblum
On June 25, the U.S. Supreme Court properly found that a woman infected with the human
immunodeficiency virus, the virus that causes AIDS, is a person with a "disability" under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. But the decision- Bragdon v. Abbott- was more complicated than it needed to
be. In the court's contorted statutory maneuvers, Bragdon all too accurately reflected the current state
of litigation under the ADA.
When Sidney Abbott sought dental treatment, Dr. Randon Bragdon informed her that his policy was
to fill the cavities of HIV-infected individuals only in hospital settings and not in his dental office. Abbott
would be required to travel to the hospital and pay the hospital fee, in addition to the dentist's fee. She
chose instead to bring suit, charging discriminatory treatment under the ADA. Abbott's argument was
that the American Dental Association and public health authorities had previously advised that HIV-
infected patients could be treated safely in dental offices and, thus, she deserved treatment comparable
to that afforded other patients.
Abbott was granted summary judgment at the district court level. The court ruled that she was a
person with a disability under the ADA because her HIV infection substantially limited her in the major
life activity of reproduction, and that Dr. Bragdon had no objective basis for believing that treating her
in his office would pose a "direct threat" to himself- a defense under the ADA for refusal to provide
services to a person with a disability. The First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on the same
bases.
OBJECTIVE BASIS REQUIRED
One of the questions presented to the Supreme Court was whether Bragdon's belief that Abbott could
be treated safely only in a hospital setting should be given deference in deciding whether he had subjected
Abbott to discriminatory action. Five members of the court, in an opinion written by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, concluded that health care professionals must assess the risk of infection based on "objective,
scientific information," and that Bragdon's "belief that a significant risk existed" would not relieve him
from liability. But because at least three justices in the majority were unsure whether the First Circuit
had correctly assessed the evidence on this question, the case was remanded for a second evaluation.
What Justice Kennedy spent the bulk of his analysis on was the threshold question: Was Sidney
Abbott a person with a "disability" under the ADA who had standing to challenge the alleged
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discriminatory treatment? Kennedy's opinion thus reflected a consistent trend in ADA litigation, in which
energy, effort and pages of printed words are expended on the basic question of whether the plaintiff is
a person with a "disability" under the law.
To AIDS, disability and civil rights advocates who worked for passage of the ADA, the fact that the
Supreme Court was asked whether people with HIV infection were covered under the 1990 law bordered
on the bizarre. If there was one medical condition these advocates had to know was covered, it was
AIDS and I-IV infection. The Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic had called for a law to
protect people with AIDS and asymptomatic HIV infection, and those recommendations were
consistently repeated by members of Congress supporting the ADA.
Other members railed against the fact that people with AIDS and HIV infection were covered. And
the final four months of consideration of the ADA were dominated by tense negotiations and lobbying
on one provision which would have allowed restaurant owners to transfer people with HIV infection out
of food-handling jobs. Following dramatic meetings and intense Senate hallway negotiations, that
provision was ultimately modified to apply only to people whose communicable diseases could be
transmitted through the food supply- a list that did not include HIV
Why, these advocates wondered, was the Supreme Court now being asked whether people with HIV
infection were covered under the ADA? If they had not been covered (for example, if only people with
AIDS had been covered), most of the drama surrounding the food-handler amendment would have been
beside the point.
OTHERS SIMILARLY BEMUSED
Other observers were similarly bemused by the Bragdon case, but for different reasons. These
onlookers found it difficult to decipher why reproduction appeared to be a central focus of the case.
Laypeople and lawyers alike found it hard to grasp how Sidney Abbott's decision not to bear children
had any relevance to Dr. Bragdon's decision not to treat her cavity in his office. Bragdon never inquired
into Abbott's life in any detail. He came into possession of one simple fact- that she was HIV-infected-
and then conveyed his policy that he would not treat her in his office.
The fact that the Supreme Court ultimately ruled by only a narrow margin, 5-4, that Abbott was
covered under the ADA, and the fact that reproduction became a central focus of the case, reflects two
simple truths. The first is that statutory text matters, and the text of the ADA requires that a person with
a "disability" be an individual who has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). The second is that statutory
text can sometimes be made to matter too much and can force courts into contortions of language and
logic that belie the purpose of the underlying law.
The cmx of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is a stolid, basic interpretation of statutory text. In a
remarkably accessible primer, Kennedy describes the course of HIV infection so as to demonstrate that
AIDS meets the requirement of being a "physical impairment" during every stage of the disease. Kennedy
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then systematically addresses the additional statutory requirement that the physical impairment
substantially limit a major life activity.
In an interesting and important aside, he first expressly acknowledges that Abbott and several of the
amici argued that HIV infection has a profound impact on almost every phase of an infected person's life.
Although conceding that it might seem "legalistic" to focus solely on reproduction, Kennedy then
justifies his narrow focus on the grounds that the courts below treated reproduction as the major life
activity limited by Abbott's impairment.
SEXUALITY IS CENTRAL TO LIFE
Justice Kennedy's discussion of the statutory standard of a "major" life activity is itself brief and
uncomplicated. He concludes that the term "major" encompasses any activity that is significant, and that
reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself "
Kennedy goes to greater lengths to explain how HIV infection substantially limits this life activity.
HIV infection limits the individual's ability to reproduce, he explains, because a person infected with HIV
who attempts to conceive imposes on his or her mate a significant risk of becoming infected, and because
an infected woman risks infecting the baby during gestation and childbirth. Because the statutory text
requires only that a major life activity be substantially limited, and not that it be utterly impossible,
Kennedy concludes that conception and childbirth are substantially limited for a person with HIV
infection.
Following this textual analysis, Justice Kennedy explains that his holding is "confirmed" by a
consistent course of agency and judicial opinion that established coverage of HIV infection under the
definition of "handicap" for purposes of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973- the federal law on which
the ADA was expressly modeled. Kennedy notes that his conclusion is "further reinforced" by the
administrative guidance issued by various federal agencies subsequent to the ADA, including that of the
Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in which individuals with
HIV infection are presumed to be covered.
The dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and joined by Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, does not address at all the legal landscape that existed when Congress
passed the ADA or the subsequent agency interpretations of the ADA Instead, the dissent argues that
every plaintiff must prove that a particular life activity was major for her, and that the impairment resulted
in a substantial limitation of that life activity for her. As far as Rehnquist is concerned, Abbott presented
no evidence that reproduction was a major activity for her prior to becoming infected with HIV
REPRODUCTION NOT A MAJOR ACTIVITY
Moreover, according to Rehnquist, reproduction is not a major life activity, as conceived of under the
statutory text. Drawing on the illustrative list of major life activities noted in agency ADA regulations
(which include caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
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breathing, learning and working), Rehnquist concludes that " fundamental importance . is not the
common thread linking the statute's sic listed activities," but rather the fact that the activities are
"repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual."
These activities are quite different, according to Rehnquist, from reproduction.
Rehnquist also faults Abbott for not explaining how her HIV infection makes her "less able" to engage
in the activity of reproduction. The fact that the fatal nature of HIV infection would result in Abbott's
being unable to care for her child in the long term is irrelevant, explains Rehnquist, because the statutory
text is focused on the present: an impairment that substantially limits (present tense) a major life activity.
Abbott's argument, charges Rehnquist, "taken to its logical extreme, would render every individual with
a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some possible future
effects."
The majority and the dissent in Bragdon thus fight on the same battleground: the meaning of
"disability" under the ADA. The majority commands five votes in this fight, the dissent commands four.
(Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion, curtly and disrnissively concluding that
while the act of giving birth is very important to many women, it is not generally the same as the
representative major life activities listed in the ADA regulations.) But the irony is that the very existence
of this battlefield was not apparent to the Congress that passed the ADA.
EXTENDING THE REHAB ACT
During passage of the ADA, little, if no, attention was paid by the lawmakers or the advocates to
what life activities were "major," or how particular impairments "substantially limited" those activities.
The reason for this lack of attention was simple. Congress understood the ADA as merely extending to
the private sector 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the law that for 15 years had prohibited federal fund
recipients from discriminating on the basis of handicap. Indeed, Congress used the definition of
"handicap" applicable to 504 as its definition of "disability" for purposes of the ADA. And under 504
case law, the battlefield on which the Bragdon opinion was waged hardly existed.
Under the 504 definition, individuals with a range of significant medical conditions had been held by
federal courts to be handicapped. The conditions covered included vision in one eye, depressive
neurosis, epilepsy, congenital limb deficiency, multiple sclerosis, AIDS and HIV infection, cerebral palsy,
limited mobility of arm and shoulder, learning disabilities, diabetes, heart disease, asthma, hepatitis B
carrier, sterility, asbestosis, Crohn's disease, alcoholism, and drug addiction. The range of conditions
covered under 504 was so broad that one of the main arguments presented by the National Federation
of Independent Businesses against the ADA was that it would cover more than 900 different medical
conditions.
One of the most fascinating aspects ofjudicial decisions under 504, however, was that courts rarely
analyzed how a particular medical condition met the statutory requirement of being a physical or mental
impairment that " substantially limited" a "major life activity." Agency regulations for 504 implied that
the statutory requirements were designed primarily to exclude trivial impairments, such as infected fingers
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or a common cold. Thus, as long as a stated impairment seemed relatively serious, courts rarely
scrutinized (and lawyers rarely challenged) whether the impairment "substantially limited" a life activity
that was sufficiently "major."
AN INTERESTING TWIST
Given this backdrop of 504 case law, Congress assumed that the same broad range of medical
conditions would be covered under the ADA's definition of" disability," and that non-meritorious cases
would be dealt with in a similar manner. Instead, an interesting twist developed. In almost all ADA
cases, defense lawyers began claiming not only that their clients had not discriminated on the basis of the
plaintiffs disability (or had engaged in justified discrimination based on disability), but also that the
plaintiff did not even have a disability for purposes of the ADA. And in non-meritorious cases, courts
consistently began to adopt a stringent reading of the statutory definition to conclude that individuals
with conditions ranging from breast cancer to epilepsy to diabetes to HIV infection were not persons
with disabilities under the law because they were not "substantially limited" in some "major life activity."
This trend soon dominated ADA jurisprudence. In 1997, the editors of the National Disability Law
Reporter surveyed all ADA cases brought in 1995 and 1996 and found that in I 10 cases the question had
been raised as to whether the plaintiff met the definition of disability under the ADA. In only six of these
cases had the judges definitively found that the plaintiff met the definition.
The court's opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott will, in all likelihood, result in lower courts systematically
finding that plaintiffs with HIV infection are covered under the ADA. Some of these courts will hold that
a person with HIV infection is limited in the life activity of reproduction- others will adopt Justice
Kennedy's acknowledgment that HIV infection also substantially limits other major life activities because,
in the words of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's concurrence, it "inevitably pervades life's choices."
The unanswered question is whether the Supreme Court's opinion will also influence lower courts to
hold that the broad range of medical conditions that were covered under 504 are similarly covered under
the ADA. Both the lower courts and the Supreme Court would do well to pay closer attention to what
Congress intended to cover in the words it adopted, and to do justice in interpreting those terms.
Copyright 0 1998 American Lawyer Media, L.P.
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TO INCUR LIABILITY, ACTIONS MUST 'SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE'
The National Law Journal
June 8, 1998
Police officers who cause accidents that kill or hurt others, even innocent bystanders, during a high-
speed pursuit of a criminal suspect are not liable unless their actions "shock the conscience," the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled May 26. Sacramento County v. Lewis, 96-1377.
The decision unanimously rejected a less protective standard that would have made police liable if
they showed a "reckless disregard for life."
Justice David H. Souter wrote for the court that police are entitled to considerable protection for the
"split-second judgments" their work demands. "A police officer deciding whether to give chase must
balance on the one hand the need to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is no way to
freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed threat to everyone within stopping range, be they suspects,
their passengers, other drivers or bystanders," he said. The majority added: "Only a purpose to cause
harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking
to the conscience, necessary for a due-process violation."
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed
concurring opinions. Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia wrote opinions concurring in the
judgment, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion.
Copyright P 1998 The New York Law Publishing Company
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SCALIA MOCKS INCONSISTENT HIGH COURT
The Montgomery Advertiser
June 20, 1998
Editorial; Pg. 10A
By James Kilpatrick
Over the mocking concurrence of Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court last month extended
constitutional protection to police officers who engage in high-speed chases. The court's decision made
sense as a practical matter, but it plainly caused discomfiture on the bench.
The facts were never in dispute. On an evening in May 1990 in Sacramento County, Calif, Deputy
Sheriff James Everett Smith attempted to stop a motorcycle driven by Brian Willard, 18. His passenger
was Philip Lewis, 16.
When Willard failed to stop, Smith and a fellow deputy pursued. The 75-second chase ended when
Willard failed to make a sharp left turn. Lewis was thrown free. The pursuing patrol car skidded into the
youth. He died at the scene.
Lewis' parents brought suit. They won in the lower courts, but on May 26 the Supremes reached a
unanimous conclusion: The deputies had not violated young Lewis' constitutional rights.
Justice David Souter spoke for the high court, but the court's voice suffered from laryngitis. There
were five concurring opinions. Souter held that the correct test of due process is whether the state's
conduct "shocks the conscience." In the case at hand, his own conscience was not shocked. Souter
explained:
"Smith was faced with a course of lawless behavior for which the police were not to blame."
Chief Justice William Rehnquist laconically concurred. He agreed that "shocks the conscience," rather
than "deliberate indifference" or "reckless disregard," is indeed the right test.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, said the shock-the-conscience test
"must be viewed with considerable skepticism." The phrase "has the unfortunate connotation of a
standard laden with subjective assessments." Even so, in circumstances such as these, the judicial
conscience will not be shocked if "police conduct a dangerous chase of a suspect who disobeys a lawful
command to stop when they determine it is appropriate to do so."
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Justices Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens filed fussy concurring opinions of no particular
moment. It remained for the irrepressible Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, to poke a sardonic
stick in his colleagues' inconsistent eye.
It was just a year ago, he reminded them, that they had rejected the very reasoning that they now
adopted. Then the court had spoken grandly of relying upon "our nation's history, legal traditions and
practices" to direct and restrain their exposition of the due process clause. Now they had resorted to the
highly subjective test of "shocks the conscience."
"Today's opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Ghandi, the
Cellophane of subjectivity, th' ol' 'shocks the conscience' test."
The test that triggered Scalia's derision dates from a case in 1952 involving behavior by a government
officer that was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary
conscience." Scalia scorned the notion. Rather than ask "whether the police conduct here at issue shocks
my unelected conscience, I would ask whether our nation has traditionally protected the right that (Lewis'
parents) assert."
THE STATES are free, said Scalia, to enact laws governing tort liability in cases of police pursuit,
but for judges to overrule such democratically adopted acts on the ground that they shock THEIR
consciences "is not judicial review but judicial governance."
My own view, often expressed, is that we live by a curious Constitution. Its chains are forged of rubber
bands. We leave it to judges to decide what speech is "free," what searches are "reasonable," what laws
are "appropriate." In the Sacramento case the high court has told us what conduct is "due." Like Scalia,
I would concur in the justices' decision, but not in the evanescent path that led them there.
Copyright @ 1998 The Advertiser Company.
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MORE OF O'CONNOR'S MUDDLED MODERATION; MAJORITY OPINION ON
ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS PLACATES BOTH SIDES
Fulton County Daily Report
July 8, 1998
Stuart Taylor Jr.
In terms of artistic merit, Justice Antonin Scalia's sizzling concurrence was the winner among the
opinions accompanying the Supreme Court's June 25 decision upholding, sort of, a 1990 law that tells
the National Endowment for the Arts to consider "general standards of decency" when it awards money
based on artistic merit.
"Avant-garde artistes," Scalia wrote--with disdain for the lot of them, or at least for those who cry
"censorship" while seeking handouts "remain entirely free to ipater les bourgeois, they are merely
deprived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it."
But at the court, the winning formula is neither artistic merit nor decency. It's getting five votes. Justice
Scalia did not do that; his opinion-- stressing that Congress should be free to deny public money to
artists who smear their naked bodies with chocolate or submerge crucifixes in urine--was joined only by
Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice David Souter, who wanted to strike down the 1990 law, was alone in
dissent.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by her remaining five colleagues, wrote the opinion for the court
in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, which sustained the statute--but only "by gutting it," in
Scalia's view. O'Connor suggested that the 1990 law's constitutionality might be in doubt if (as both
Scalia and Souter asserted) it did require "a penalty on disfavored viewpoints." She upheld it by straining
to read it as "advisory," and thus largely toothless.
This was, in short, a classically O'Connoresque exercise in muddled moderation, lacking elegant
analysis or memorable lines, and easily attacked as illogical from the pure, polar positions of Scalia and
Souter.
The O'Connor opinion was also a pretty good outcome, however. It resolved an essentially symbolic
skirmish in the culture wars by giving both sides something to crow about, while letting the NEA get
back to its usually benign if boring business of financing the works of orchestras and the like.
From the right, House Speaker Newt Gingrich applauded the court for vindicating "the right of the
American people to not pay for art that offends their sensibilities." From the left, the American Civil
Liberties Union expressed relief that the court had rendered the law "essentially meaningless."
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A judicial fudge that placates partisans on both sides is not a good thing, of course, if it sacrifices
important constitutional principles to expediency. But it is a good thing when the court avoids a collision
between two vital principles that can co-exist only if neither is carried to the limits of its logic.
The two principles at stake here are both woven deeply into our traditions and precedents. The first,
honored by Scalia, is that in a democracy the people cannot, and in the long run will not, be taxed to
subsidize "art"--or any other form of speech--that they abhor. The second, honored by Souter, is that
the First Amendment bars all "viewpoint discrimination in the exercise of public authority over expressive
activity."
This battle began in 1989, when Congress got into an uproar over two NEA grants that totaled
$45,000. One went to Andres Serrano, whose "Piss Christ"--a photograph of a crucifix immersed in
urine--enraged religious conservatives. The other helped finance an exhibit of the late Robert
Mapplethorpe's stunningly rendered photographs of such homoerotic scenes as a man urinating into
another's mouth.
Conservatives led by Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., pressed for a ban on NEA funding of such "indecent"
art. But others warned that this smacked of censorship, and avant-garde artists painted dark visions of
oppression descending on the land.
The 1990 statute that resulted was a vague, watered-down compromise. It required the arts agency
to consider "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public." But it stopped short of explicitly barring federal subsidies for any particular viewpoint,
"indecent" or otherwise.
The NEA diluted the statute further, implausibly construing it as requiring no more than geographic,
ethnic and aesthetic diversity on the agency's advisory panels. But the NEA also shied away from further
support of art as inflammatory as that of Mapplethorpe and Serrano,
Four artists whose grant applications were rejected in 1990--after they had been blessed by an NEA
advisory panel--sued the agency, asserting that they had been rejected for political reasons and that the
1990 law was unconstitutional. The name plaintiff was Karen Finley, a performance artist known for
covering her body with chocolate (signifying excrement) to make a symbolic statement (she said) about
abused women.
The crux of Justice O'Connor's holding was that the 1990 statute posed no "realistic danger to First
Amendment values" because its "advisory" language did not "disallow any particular viewpoints," but
rather merely specified that the "decency and respect" criteria were among the inherently subjective
factors to be considered in the NEA's "assessment of artistic merit."
This was a deliberately cramped reading. But it draws plausibility from the legislative history. It also
draws legitimacy from the court's long-standing practice of straining to read statutes narrowly if doing
so is necessary to avoid potential constitutional problems.
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The potential problem here, O'Connor noted, was posed by precedents holding that "even in the
provision of subsidies, the government may not seek 'the suppression of dangerous ideas.' " She
intimated that the court might bar any application of the 1990 statute that amounted to clear viewpoint
discrimination. But she also hedged, by noting that "the Government may allocate competitive funding
according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty
at stake."
An ambiguous, inconclusive muddle? Yes--but one preferable to the sharp analytical extremes
represented by Scalia and Souter. Both were cogent in stressing that the 1990 law was designed to
require the NEA to discriminate against (although not to ban all funding of) disfavored viewpoints. But
neither was entirely persuasive on the constitutional issue.
Justice Scalia was too facile in claiming that viewpoint discrimination "is perfectly constitutional" when
it comes to endowment grants.
As a general proposition, government money must often be subjected to First Amendment strictures,
given its massive role in the economy and in facilitating private speech-- whether by subsidizing
university tuition, or by giving preferential postage rates to publications, or by providing parks and
streets as public forums for protest marches.
And in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia (1995), the court ruled that a state
university that financed student publications violated the First Amendment right of free speech when it
denied funding to otherwise qualified publications with religious viewpoints.
Scalia dismissed Rosenberger as irrelevant because the funding there was available on a nonselective
basis to all student publications except religious ones, whereas the NEA is necessarily selective and must
reject most applications for its scarce funds. But would Scalia uphold a state university subsidy scheme
that, say, selectively supported publications deemed to exhibit editorial excellence, while excluding any
that failed to display empathy for the radical feminist perspective? I don't think so.
Justice Souter, on the other hand, was kidding himself if he thought that barring any congressional
deviation from viewpoint neutrality--and leaving it to the NEA to choose among competitors on the basis
of "artistic merit"--would purge the process of viewpoint discrimination.
As Justice O'Connor noted, the 1990 statute seems unlikely to "introduce any greater element of
subjectivity than the determination of 'artistic excellence' itself " At a time when much "art" exudes
political messages and little else, assessments of "artistic merit" are often steeped in viewpoint
discrimination. Karen Finley's chocolate-smeared performance may be a thing of beauty to those attuned
to her message. But would the NEA advisory panelists who supported Finley also have gone to bat for
a painter who used her technical virtuosity to preach that a mother's place is at home with her children?
I don't think so.
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The point is not that the one artist is better than the other. It is that the government cannot avoid a
measure of viewpoint discrimination when it rewards "artistic merit " And that suggests that if
government is to be a patron of the arts at all, the people's elected representatives are entitled to some
say in what they will pay for.
Copyright 1998 American Lawyer Media, L.P.
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NEA LAW ON DECENCY IS UPHELD
The Boston Globe
June 26, 1998
Patti Hartigan, Globe Staff
By an 8-to-I vote yesterday, the Supreme Court upheld a 1990 law requiring the National Endowment
for the Arts to consider "general standards of decency" in its grant-making process.
The court reversed a 1996 federal appeals court decision that declared the law unconstitutional for
violating the right to free speech and due process.
Yesterday's ruling sent shock waves through the artistic community in Boston and nationwide, with
artists and administrators warning of a chilling effect on cultural expression. But the decision was
applauded by groups that have opposed the NEA and a handful of its controversial grants, most notably
those that went to exhibitions that displayed the photography of Andres Serrano and the late Robert
Mapplethorpe.
"We are living in an ice age, and this decision will prove to be a cold, snowy white monument," said
Holly Hughes, one of four performance artists who sued the government in I990 after they were denied
federal funding.
Hughes, Karen Finley, Tim Miller, and John Fleck, known as "the NEA four," settled their original
claims against the government in 1993 for damages totaling $252,000. But they continued their legal
challenge against the "decency clause."
"I have seen what the threat of the 'decency' language has done to the world I work in," Hughes said.
"It has destroyed the alternative arts scene in this country."
But William Donohue, president of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, called the
decision "a victory for common sense, as well as decency." The Washington-based Family Research
Council also lauded the decision, as did House Speaker Newt Gingrich.
"Today the Supreme Court validated the right of the American people to not pay for art that offends
their sensibilities," Gingrich said.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concluded that the law is "valid, as it neither
inherently interferes with First Amendment rights nor violates constitutional vagueness principles."
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The court qualified its decision by writing, "Even in the provision of subsidies, the government may
not 'aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas,' and if a subsidy were 'manipulated' to have a 'coercive
effect,' then relief could be appropriate."
The law was enacted in 1990 at the height of a controversy in Congress over NEA grants that
indirectly funded art by Mapplethorpe, whose work includes graphic homoerotic images, and by Serrano,
particularly for his infamous photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine, titled "Piss Christ." The law
required the NEA to consider, in making grant awards, "general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."
"The court reaffirms the principle that the government cannot discriminate against unpopular political
ideas," said Marjorie Heins, outgoing director of the Arts Censorship Project at the American Civil
Liberties Union and one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs. "But at the same time, it is an unrealistic way
of viewing the message this law sends to the NEA and to artists to be careful and conscious and to
censor themselves."
In their original suit, the four performance artists charged that they were "blacklisted" by the NEA for
their political views; Hughes, Miller and Fleck are gay and address their sexuality in solo performances,
and Finley is known for her stridently feminist material.
Since the suit was filed, the NEA has restructured its grant-making system, cutting out grants to
individual artists, channeling most of its funds to state arts councils, and limiting arts institutions to one
grant application per year. Congress has cut the budget over the years to current allotment of $98
million.
NEA chairman William J. Ivey, who was on Capitol Hill yesterday seeking congressional support for
the agency, said in a statement that he was pleased with the Supreme Court decision. "The endowment's
citizen-review panels represent the broad diversity of the American people," he said.
The court's lone dissenter, David Souter, argued that the law should be struck down because it carries
"a significant power to chill artistic production and display."
Arts administrators echoed that sentiment.
"It is a dark day," said David Ross, executive director of San Francisco's Museum of Modern Art and
former director of the Institute of Contemporary Art in Boston. "It is a complete refutation of the
founding principles of the NEA, which were to support excellence and to insulate the process from the
winds of politics."
Ross and others, however, said that the NEA is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the nation's
nonprofit arts organizations. It has limited grant applications to four broad categories, and it no longer
provides general operating support for nonprofits.
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"The issue about government funding is practically moot because it doesn't exist anymore," said Robert
Brustein, artistic director of the American Repertory Theatre in Cambridge. The theater, he said,
received about $800,000 a year from the NEA before the controversy began, it received $62,500 this
year.
But, he added, "It's going to send a chill through the artistic community, and you can already see it in
the conservative and safe choices most theaters are making."
Finley, who became widely known as "the chocolate woman" for a perfonnance in which she smeared
chocolate and alfalfa sprouts on her body as a symbol, she said, of oppression against women, worked
her response into her performance last night at an alternative theater in the TriBeCa district of
Manhattan. Her show, "The Return of the Chocolate Smeared Woman," opened Wednesday.
Wearing only the chocolate, panties, a pink boa and silver high-heeled shoes, Finley said she was
disappointed. "Who's going to be deciding what's decent or indecent'" she asked. "Is it a banana going
into someone's mouth, is it covering your body with chocolate?"
The case is National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 97-371.
Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company
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RENO v. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE
By Troy R. Rackham
Can Congress close the courthouse doors to individuals with Constitutionally protected freedom of
association claims when these individuals have not pursued all other administrative avenues available?
This is the question at issue in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discriminiation Committee.
This case began eleven years ago in Los Angeles, when seven Palestinians and one Kenyan were
arrested and held for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) because they were
raising money for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The State Department
classifies PFLP as a terrorist organization and the eight individuals arrested were charged with
supporting terrorism. When the INS brought deportation proceedings against the eight individuals, these
individuals petitioned the federal district court in Los Angeles for help. In multiple rulings, the district
court enjoined the deportation proceedings because it determined that the INS was selectively enforcing
its anti-terrorism laws against the eight individuals because of their association with PFLP, in violation
of the First Amendment's protection of the freedom of association.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRRA). The
IIRRA was enacted to alleviate Congress' concern about long delays in the deportation process by
removing jurisdiction from federal courts to review deportation proceedings. After Congress' enactment
of the IIRRA, federal courts only had jurisdiction to review final deportation orders.
Pursuant to this new law, the Justice Department argued to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that
the district court in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee was without jurisdiction to enjoin
the deportation proceedings because the IIRRA applies retroactively. While the Ninth Circuit agreed
that the IIRRA applies retroactively, it held that the district court nonetheless had jurisdiction to enjoin
the deportation of the eight individuals because the constitutional freedom of association was at issue.
The Ninth Circuit held, according to well settled principles of constitutional law, that the IIRRA must
be interpreted to preserve the authority of federal courts to hear constitutional questions.
The Court granted certiorari in this case to give a definitive answer to the important procedural
question presented by this case. Indeed, while this case may seem at first glance to present only the
technical legal issue ofjurisdiction before the Court, the ramifications of the Court's holding could be
significant. If the Court reverses the Ninth Circuit and finds that federal courts do not have the power
to review deportation proceedings until a final deportation order has been entered, immigrants may be
denied any substantial federal court review of their constitutional rights claims. Indeed, federal courts
will only have jurisdiction to review final deportation orders based on the limited set of facts taken by
the immigration judge. This would practically leave the immigration judge to decide the content and
breadth of the constitutional rights of immigrants who are on the verge of being deported without any
substantial review in federal court.
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On the other hand, a Supreme court affirmance of the Ninth Circuit opinion could leave Congress'
intent in passing the IIRRA hollow. Congress intended to ease the pressures of illegal immigration on
this country by removing federal court jurisdiction to review deportation proceedings. The assumption
was that deportation of illegal immigrants would be expedited if no federal court review was available
until a final deportation order was issued.
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HIGH COURT TO REVIEW IMMIGRATION LAW OF '96
The Washington Post
June 2, 1998
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court said yesterday it will review for the first time whether a 1996 law unfairly bars
immigrants who face deportation from protesting the action in the nation's federal courts. The case arises
from the government's effort to deport eight foreigners it says are tied to Palestinian terrorists.
The high-profile case has become a cause of First Amendment advocates and other civil libertarians
because the immigrants say they were targeted for deportation as a result of their association with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Now, it has become a crucial test of whether the 1996 immigration law went too far in curtailing
certain access to federal trial courts. A Supreme Court ruling in the case could affect
immigrants challenging deportation in a range of situations.
The case before the court specifically tests whether immigrants who claim they have been selectively
prosecuted or otherwise suffered a violation of their constitutional rights can go to court or must
proceed instead through a limited and sometimes lengthy administrative process.
Before the 1996 law, the Justice Department says, federal courts were generally barred from hearing
deportation challenges until all administrative routes were exhausted. The department says the law
strengthened and made explicit those limits.
"Congress can't bar people, whether they be immigrants or citizens, from going to federal court when
substantial constitutional violations are at issue," said Georgetown University law professor David D.
Cole, representing seven Palestinians and one Kenyan protesting deportation.
But Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman told the justices that Congress intended to foreclose all judicial
review of deportation proceedings until other administrative avenues had been exhausted.
In his appeal of a lower-court decision favoring the immigrants, Waxman said going through the
administrative process before getting to a federal appeals court would not irreparably hurt someone
fighting deportation, even in a First Amendment case. He noted the courts have long deferred to
executive branch enforcement of immigration laws.
The case of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee traces to 1987, when the
Immigration and Naturalization Service tried to deport eight immigrants in Los Angeles because of their
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activities on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Justice Department notes
in its filing that the PLPF violently opposes U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East and has been
responsible for numerous acts of terrorism and the deaths of many Americans over the past three
decades.
The immigrants argued to lower courts that the PLPF engages in a range of lawful activities and that
they had made a sufficient initial case that the government was selectively enforcing deportation law.
After the group prevailed, the Justice Department appealed on various grounds. Most recently, it
contended that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 clarifies the
law that courts may not hear a challenge to a deportation case until other administrative procedures have
been followed. The government said the lower court never should have taken up the selective
prosecution case.
Oral arguments will be heard in the term that begins next October and a ruling is not likely until 1999.
Copyright @ 1998 by The Washington Post.
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COURT TO REVIEW DEPORTATION CASE OF ACTIVISTS
Los Angeles Times
June 2, 1998
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON -- Taking up the case of a group of Palestinian activists from Los Angeles, the
Supreme Court agreed Monday to hear the government's charge that judges are barred from blocking
a move to deport immigrants, even when they are targeted for their political views.
The case, to be heard in the fall, gives the high court its first look at provisions of the 1996
immigration law in which Congress closed the courthouse door to immigrants who are facing possible
deportation.
Frustrated at long delays in deportations, Congress took away the power of judges to hear such
cases. "No court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from" the government's move to seek deportation, the law says. The only exception is for a final
deportation order. Then, a U.S. court of appeals is empowered to review the evidence.
For more than a decade, however, the so-called "L.A. 8" have succeeded in staving off deportation
and winning a series of victories in the federal courts in California.
In 1987, seven Palestinians and one Kenyan were arrested and held for possible deportation because
they were raising money for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The group is classified as
a terrorist organization by the State Department and the eight were charged with supporting terrorism.
But their lawyers noted that the PFLP engages in a wide array of lawful activities such as education,
day care, health care and sponsorship of publications. The eight said that they had done nothing illegal
in the United States and were being targeted for punishment because of their political views.
U.S. District Judge Stephen Wilson in Los Angeles, as well as the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
agreed in multiple rulings. They blocked the deportation proceedings and said that the 1st Amendment
does not permit "guilt by association."
In its latest ruling, the appeals court agreed with the government that the 1996 law closes the
courthouse door to most challenges to deportation. However, it also ruled that constitutional claims are
the exception. Because the Palestinians say that they were targeted because of their political beliefs in
violation of the 1st Amendment, their challenge can go forward, the 9th Circuit said.
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The Clinton administration appealed, arguing that neither Wilson nor the 9th Circuit had the authority
to intervene in the deportations. These judges "have flouted clear statutory limitations on their own
jurisdiction and have imposed wholly unwarranted constraints on the executive branch," U.S. Solicitor
General Seth Waxman stated to the high court.
In a brief order Monday, the justices agreed to hear the government's appeal in the case (Reno vs.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 97-1252).
Georgetown University law professor David D. Cole, who has represented the Palestinians, said he
will argue that the protection of the 1st Amendment trumps the jurisdictional limit imposed by Congress.
"Millions of American citizens and immigrants 'associate' with the NRA, the ACLU, the Boy Scouts
or labor unions by paying dues, donating funds or raising money," he said. "Soliciting and donating funds
is a form of constitutionally protected political association."
Copyright 0 1998 Times Mirror Company.
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COURT TO TEST IMMIGRATION LAW
AP Online
Monday, June 1, 1998
By Laurie Asseo
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court today agreed to use the government's effort to deport
a group of Palestinians to clarify a 1996 immigration law's limits on court review of such cases.
The justices said they will hear the government's contention that lower courts lacked authority to
hear the Palestinians' argument that they were singled out for selective enforcement of immigration laws.
The Palestinians are accused of supporting a foreign terrorist organization.
The government has been trying since 1987 to deport eight Los Angeles-area aliens, including seven
Palestinians and the Kenyan-born wife of one of them.
Immigration officials say the eight are members or supporters of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, which has been labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.
The eight asked a federal judge to stop the deportation proceeding, saying they were victims of
selective enforcement. In 1994, the judge temporarily barred the Immigration and Naturalization Service
from conducting deportation proceedings against them.
In 1996, while the Palestinians' case was pending, Congress voted to allow deportation cases to be
taken to court only after the INS has issued a final order. In such cases, a federal appeals court would
review the deportation order.
Also in 1996, Congress passed an anti-terrorism law that makes it a crime for anyone- citizen or
noncitizen- to provide financial support to a foreign organization labeled terrorist by the secretary of
state.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals last year upheld the district court's order, saying the new
immigration law did not bar the judge from hearing the Palestinians' case because they raised a free-
speech issue that might not get adequate judicial review after issuance of a final deportation order.
The 9th Circuit court also said raising money for an organization that engages in both terrorist and
legal activities does not justify deportation unless the fund-raisers intended to support terrorism.
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In the appeal acted on today, Justice Department lawyers said the lower courts "flouted clear
statutory limitations" on their authority to hear such cases, and that the rulings would harm the
government's ability to enforce the law barring financial support to foreign terrorists.
Lawyers for the Palestinians said donating funds is a form of free speech, and that courts long have
ruled that association with a political group cannot be penalized without proof of intent to further the
group's illegal goals.
The case is Reno vs. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 97-1252.
Copyright W 1998 The Associated Press.
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97-1252 RENO v. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE
Ruling below (CA 9, 119 F.3d 1367):
Although Section 242(g) of Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the 1996
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, applies to pending cases, thereby
depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to hear certain cases on behalf of aliens until final order of
deportation is issued, such provision incorporates an exception that permits prompt federal review of
constitutional claims when no other avenue of meaningful federal review is available.
Accordingly, although a final deportation order has not been issued, federal district courts may retainjurisdiction over an aliens' federal action to contest their deportation proceedings on grounds that
government singled them out for selective enforcement of immigration laws in retaliation
for their constitutionally protected associational activity.
The district court's order denying government's motion to dissolve preliminary injunction on behalf of
certain aliens, and its grant of injunction on behalf of certain other aliens, is affirmed. Injunctive relief
was originally granted because aliens established prima facie case of selective enforcement by showing
that others similarly situated- aliens affiliated with groups that have advocated violence and
destruction of property- were not prosecuted and that prosecution was based on impermissible
motive, namely their association with a disfavored group- Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine.
The only change since the original time when relief was granted is the government's evidence that the
eight aliens participated in fundraising activities for PFLP and the government's contention that such
activity is 'terrorist activity' that qualifies aliens as deportable, but such change of circumstances simply
represents government's decision to change its litigation strategy with respect to certain aliens. With
respect to certain other aliens encompassed by additional preliminary injunction, government's
claims are meritless. Thus dissolution of injunction is not justified.
Question presented: In light of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,did courts below have jurisdiction to entertain respondents' challenge to deportation proceedings prior
to entry of final order of deportation?
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AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
Janet RENO, Attorney General, et al, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Decided July 10, 1997.
D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
The central issues in this case are (1) whether
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), as amended by the
recently enacted Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA") applies retroactively; and (2)
whether the provision eliminates federal
jurisdiction over a case such as this one, in
which aliens have filed a federal suit
challenging deportation proceedings on First
Amendment grounds before a final order of
deportation has been issued. We conclude that
subsection (g) applies to pending cases but
that the provision does not bar jurisdiction in
this case. Because subsection (g) states that it
applies "except as provided in this section," we
conclude that the amended version of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(f), which permits certain collateral
challenges to INS action, also applies by
incorporation. We find that subsection (f)
allows the instant suit because the factual
record for the Plaintiffs' First Amendment
claims cannot be developed in administrative
proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the decision of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") to commence deportation proceedings
against seven native Palestinians and one
native Kenyan affiliated with the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP"). The
complete factual history of this case is set forth
in this court's prior opinion affirming the grant
of a preliminary injunction to six of the aliens
on First Amendment grounds. To summarize,
briefly:
The eight named aliens in this case,
("Plaintiffs"), have participated in PFLP events
to varying degrees. The PFLP is an
international organization with ties to
Palestine, and which the district court
concluded is engaged in a wide range of lawful
activities, including the provision of
"education, day care, health care, and social
security, as well as cultural activities,
publications, and political organizing." The
government avers that the PFLP is an
international terrorist and communist
organization, but does not dispute the district
court's finding that the organization conducts
lawful activities.
In January, 1987, the INS arrested the
Plaintiffs and initiated deportation proceedings
against them. Six of the Plaintiffs in this case,
Barakat, Sharif, Mungai, Ayman Obeid, Amjad
Obeid, and Aner, ("the Six") were living in
this country under temporary student or visitor
visas at the time that this case was filed. The
remaining two, H-amide and Shehadeh, were
permanent resident aliens The INS charged
all of the Plaintiffs under the McCarran-Walter
Act of 1952 (" 1952 Act"), which provided for
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the deportation of aliens "who advocate the
economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism." In addition,
the INS charged the Six with non-ideological,
technical visa violations. Former FBI director
William Webster testified to Congress that "
'[a]ll of them were arrested because they are
alleged to be members of a world-wide
Communist organization which under the
McCarran Act makes them eligible for
deportation.... [I]f these individuals had been
United States citizens, there would not have
been a basis for their arrest.' " Hearings before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
on the Nomination of William H. Webster, to
be Director of Central Intelligence, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 94, 95 (April 8, 9, 30, 1987;
May 1, 1987).
The INS subsequently dropped the ideological
charges against the Six and reformulated the
1952 Act charges against Hamide and
Shehadeh. Shortly thereafter, INS regional
counsel William Odencrantz indicated "that the
change in charges was for tactical purposes
and that the INS intends to deport all eight
plaintiffs because they are members of the
PFLP " American-Arab I, 70 F.3d at 1053.
Following the repeal of the 1952 Act, the
INS commenced proceedings against Hamide
and Shehadeh under the "terrorist activity"
provision of the Immigration Act of 1990.
The Plaintiffs filed this federal action to
contest the deportation proceedings on First
Amendment grounds. They claimed that the
INS had singled them out for selective
enforcement of the immigration laws in
retaliation for their constitutionally protected
associational activity. The district court held
that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims of
Hamide and Shehadeh but granted a
preliminary injunction staying the immigration
proceedings against the Six. On appeal, this
court upheld the injunction and concluded that
the court had jurisdiction over the claims of
Hamide and Shehadeh. The district court then
entered an injunction staying the proceedings
against Hamide and Shehadeh.
The government now appeals the district
court's decision refusing to dissolve the
existing preliminary injunction and granting the
injunction in favor of Hanide and Shehadeh.
Relying on new evidence submitted to the
district court following this court's decision in
American-Arab 1, the government argues that
the deportation proceedings were initiated for
permissible reasons. Specifically, the
government cites to materials detailing the
Plaintiffs' support of PFLP fundraising
activities and argues that under the applicable
First Amendment standard, the Plaintiffs may
be sanctioned for this behavior.
In addition, while this appeal was pending,
the government filed motions to dismiss the
case both with the district court and with this
panel. The government contends that 8
U.S.C. § 12 52(g), as amended by IIRIRA,
deprives the federal courts ofjurisdiction over
all claims such as those at issue here, except
on review of final deportation orders. The
district court has determined that the new
statute does not eliminate jurisdiction in this
case, and the appeal of the district court's
decision has been consolidated with this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of a statute is a question of
law, which we review de novo.
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We review a decision regarding a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. A
district court abuses its discretion "if the court
bases its decision on an erroneous legal
conclusion or on clearly erroneous findings of
fact." American-Arab I, 70 F.3d at 1062.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
IRIRA amends section 242(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(g), to provide:
(g) Exclusive jurisdiction
Except as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law,
no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.
The government argues that subsection (g)
applies retroactively and eliminates federal
jurisdiction over this case at this stage in the
proceedings. While we agree that subsection
(g) applies, we hold that it does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction in this case.
IIRIRA explicitly provides for
retroactive application of subsection
Section 306(c) states that
the
(g).
the amendments made by subsections (a) and
(b) shall apply to all final orders of
deportation or removal and motions to
reopen filed on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act and subsection (g) of
section 242 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (as added by subsection (a)),
shall apply without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending, or future
exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings under such Act.
Thus, the provision carves out an exception to
the general rule, specified in section 309(c),
that IIRIRA does not apply to pending cases.
Two circuits already have drawn this
conclusion. The D.C. Circuit recently held
that in a federal suit challenging the execution
of a deportation order, the provision governed
even though Congress enacted IRIRA
"[s]ubsequent to the District Court hearing."
Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1213
(D.C.Cir.1997). And in a decision holding
that the effective date of amended 8 U.S.C. §
1252(g) was the same as the rest of the
IIRIRA amendments, the Seventh Circuit has
concluded that "the reference to subsection (g)
in section 306(c) is meant only to provide an
exception to section 309(c)'s nonretroactivity,
so that when IIRA comes into effect on April
1, 1997, subsection (g) will apply
retroactively, unlike the other subsections."
Lalani v. Perryman, 105 F.3d 334, 336 (7th
Cir.1997). We follow the D.C. and Seventh
Circuits and conclude that subsection (g)
applies retroactively.
We also conclude, however, that subsection
(g) incorporates certain exceptions when it
applies to pending cases Subsection (g) states
that "except as provided in this [new] section,
[8 U.S.C. § 1252]," no court can consider any
claim arising from a decision of the Attorney
General "to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien." The provision thus expressly
contemplates the applicability of other
jurisdictional amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
It is true that retroactive application of the
entire amended version of 8 U.S.C. § 1252
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would threaten to render meaningless section
306(c) of IIRIRA, which provides that in
general, the narrow set of jurisdictional
reforms codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 do not
govern in pending cases. Yet a reading of
subsection (g) that did not incorporate any
exceptions would contradict the plain meaning
of the text of (g).
Moreover, such a reading would be illogical.
Divorced from all other jurisdictional
provisions of IIRIRA, subsection (g) would
have a more sweeping impact on cases filed
before the statute's enactment than after that
date. Without incorporating any exceptions,
the provision appears to cut off federal
jurisdiction over all deportation decisions. We
do not think that Congress intended such an
absurd result. We believe that when it applies
to pending cases, (g) must apply along with at
least some of the other provisions of section
1252, as amended by IIRIRA.
We must consider, then, which provisions of
the amended version of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 are
incorporated by reference into subsection (g)
and whether any of these provisions preserve
federal jurisdiction in this case. One candidate
is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f), which provides:
(f) Limit on injunctive relief
Regardless of the nature of the action or
claim or of the identity of the party or parties
bringing the action, no court (other than the
Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or
authority to enjoin or restrain the operation
of the provisions of part IV of this
subchapter, as amended by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with
respect to the application of such provisions
to an individual alien against whom
proceedings under such part have been
initiated.
Because this case involves individual aliens
against whom deportation proceedings have
been initiated, subsection (f) would appear to
allow federal jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs'
claims.
In determining whether subsection (f) applies,
and in interpreting its meaning, we are guided
by the well-established principle that where
possible, jurisdiction-limiting statutes should
be interpreted to preserve the authority of the
courts to consider constitutional claims. The
Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that
"serious constitutional question[s] ... would
arise if a federal statute were construed to
deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim." Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 603, (1988). Under subsection (f),
individual aliens would appear to be able to
seek judicial review of constitutional claims
such as those at issue here
The government contends that subsection
(g) alone applies and that the provision does
not cut off federal review of constitutional
claims because it allows courts to consider
such claims on review of final orders of
deportation. The difficulty with this position
is that the text of (g) alone does not appear to
authorize judicial review of final orders of
deportation. The provision can be read as
authorizing such review only if it is read in
conjunction with other subsections, such as the
amended version of 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9),
which provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and
fact, includi ng interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory provisions,
arising from any action taken or proceeding
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brought to remove an alien from the United
States under this chapter shall be available
only in judicial review of a final order under
this section.
The government makes the alternative
argument that if subsection (b)(9) governs, the
provision clearly limits judicial review,
including review of all constitutional claims, to
final orders of deportation.
We disagree. Even if subsection (b)(9)
applies along with subsection (g), we believe
that subsection (f) must be incorporated as
well, and that (f) must be read to preserve
judicial review of constitutional claims such as
the ones at issue here. Any other reading
would present serious constitutional problems.
As we determined in American-Arab I, and as
the government has conceded, neither the
immigration judge ("IJ") nor the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has the authority
to consider a selective enforcement claim
during a deportation proceeding. Moreover,
a selective enforcement claim is not purely
legal but rather requires factual proof Thus,
the factual record necessary to the adjudication
of such a claim would not be available to a
federal court reviewing a final deportation
order.
In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,
the Supreme Court drew a similar conclusion.
498 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1991). At issue in
McNary was a provision of the INA that the
government argued limited judicial review to
final orders of deportation. Because the
factual record necessary to the consideration
of the plaintiffs' constitutional and procedural
statutory claims could not be developed in
administrative proceedings, the Court
construed the provision as preserving general
federal jurisdiction over the claims at issue in
the case.
The government's argument that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2347(b)(3) enables federal appellate courts
to remedy the fact-tinding deficiencies of
administrative deportation proceedings in
cases such as this one is unpersuasive. Section
2347(b)(3) allows an appellate court reviewing
an agency determination to transfer
proceedings to a district court for additional
factual development in certain circumstances.
However, we have held that this provision is
not available on review of deportation
proceedings. Because the INA limits appellate
review to the administrative record, the statute
"precludes application of the procedures ...
that permit transfer of a case to a district court
for a hearing, under circumstances set forth at
28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3)." While IIRIRA
repeals 8 U.S.C § I I 05a(a), which contained
the provision cited in American-Arab I and
Ghorbani confining appellate review to the
administrative record, IIRIRA adopts the same
requirement. 8 U S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A)
("[T]he court of appeals shall decide the
petition only on the administrative record on
which the order of removal is based.") Thus,
the statutory basis for American-Arab I and
Ghorbani remains the same, and these
decisions still control.
In addition, IlRIRA expressly forecloses the
appellate courts from remanding such cases to
the IJ for further factual development under a
related provision. The government's argument
that IIRIRA's express preclusion of section
2347(c) proceedings by negative inference
allows proceedings under section 2347(b)(3)
does not make sense because the express
statutory elimination of section 2347(b)(3)
proceedings then would have been
unnecessary. Prior to the enactment of
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IIRIRA, while some circuits had allowed
remand under section 2347(c), even those
circuits which permitted remand to the agency
under section 2347(c) did not allow
proceedings under section 2347(b)(3). Thus,
Congress needed to act only to cut off the
availability of section 2347(c).
In sum, we conclude that while subsection
(g) applies to pending cases, it incorporates
subsection (f). Moreover, even if (b)(9) is
incorporated along with (f), we read (f) as
permitting federal review of constitutional
claims such as those at issue here, because no
other avenues of meaningful federal review
remain available. Accordingly, the district
court may retain jurisdiction over this case.
II. Preliminary Injunction
This court already has upheld the preliminary
injunction in favor of the Six. In American-
Arab I, we held that "[t]he aliens' First
Amendment rights are subject to irreparable
harm because of the prosecution, and they
have a strong likelihood of success on their
claim that the INS has selectively enforced the
immigration laws in retaliation for their
exercise of constitutionally protected rights."
70 F.3d at 1066. We reached this conclusion
because we affirmed the district court's finding
that the Plaintiffs had made out a prima facie
case of selective enforcement by showing (1)
others similarly situated were not prosecuted
(disparate impact) and (2) the prosecution was
based on an impermissible motive
(discriminatory motive). We determined that
the Plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of
discriminatory motive by demonstrating that
the government targeted them "because of
their associational activities with particular
disfavored groups," and because the
government did not establish that the Plaintiffs
had the "specific intent to further [any alleged]
... illegal aims" of those groups. Id. at 1063.
Following our decision, the district court
granted an additional preliminary injunction
that included Hamide and Shehadeh.
The government has now presented new
evidence in the district court showing that the
Plaintiffs participated in fundraising activities
for the PFLP. The government argues that the
submission of this evidence has two
consequences: First, the government contends
that there is no longer sufficient evidence to
sustain the district court's finding of disparate
impact. Second, the government maintains
that the standard under which the district court
analyzed the evidence of discriminatory motive
is no longer applicable. In evaluating the
preliminary injunction in favor of the Six, we
need not consider either of the government's
arguments. As applied to the preliminary
injunction in favor of Hamide and Shehadeh,
both arguments are without merit.
A. Preliminary injunction in favor of the Six
With respect to the preliminary injunction
granted in favor of the Six, we need not
address either of the government's arguments.
The government has not demonstrated
changed circumstances. Moreover, it is
improper to use a motion to dissolve an
existing preliminary injunction to "try ... to
relitigate on a fuller record preliminary
injunction issues already decided." American
Optical Co. v Rayex Corp., 394 F.2d 155,
155 (2d Cir.1968)
The district court concluded, and the
government does not appear to dispute, that
"the government's new 10,000-page
submission was available to the government at
the time the preliminary injunction was
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entered; the government simply chose not to
litigate the facts at that time." Up until that
point, the government had argued that the
Plaintiffs did not possess the same First
Amendment rights as citizens. Because the
only change in circumstances is of the
government's own making, resulting from its
decision to change its litigation strategy, we
conclude that it is equitable to continue the
original injunction staying proceedings against
the Six without consideration of the new
evidence.
B. Preliminary injunction in favor of Hamide
and Shehadeh
1. Disparate impact
The government contends that the district
court's finding of disparate impact is clearly
erroneous because the Plaintiffs have failed to
produce sufficient evidence showing that the
INS refrained from deporting fundraisers in
other terrorist organizations. Yet the
government does not dispute the district
court's conclusion that the INS sought to
deport the Plaintiffs because of mere
membership in the PFLP. As Plaintiffs did
show that members of numerous other
organizations advocating violence and the
destruction of property were not deported, the
comparison with aliens who engaged in
fundraising for other terrorist organizations is
unnecessary.
Even if such a comparison were required,
the Plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence
to this effect. The Plaintiffs identified Toryalai
Ali, a permanent resident alien living in San
Diego who represented a Mujahedin guerrilla
organization and who contributes
approximately half of his income to the group.
In addition, the Plaintiffs introduced evidence
to show that the government did not seek to
deport aliens who distributed a newsletter
designed to build support for the Nicaraguan
contras and which included an appeal to send
money to support the Nicaraguan Democratic
Forces. The Plaintiffs also submitted asylum
files obtained in discovery demonstrating that
the INS did not move to deport 59 out of 65
members and material supporters of the
Contras and Mujahedin.
The government's assertion that "the district
court had no evidence regarding a proper
control group for Hamide and Shehadeh, who
are permanent resident aliens" is also incorrect.
As discussed above, the record contained
evidence that Toryalai Ali, a permanent
resident alien, was not deported despite his
leadership role and financial contributions to a
sub-group of the Mujahedin. The record
contains evidence of numerous other cases of
permanent resident aliens who did not face
deportation proceedings despite their support
for international organizations advocating
violence and destruction of property.
The district court did not clearly err in finding
that the Plaintiffs established disparate impact.
2. Improper motive
The district court found that, even after the
government made its supplemental evidentiary
submission, there was "no evidence in the
record that could have led a reasonable person
to believe that any of the plaintiffs had the
specific intent to fiirther the PFLP's unlawful
aims." The government does not contest this
finding. Accordingly, for the purposes of the
First Amendment analysis, we assume that the
Plaintiffs did not possess specific intent.
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The government now tries to evade the
specific intent standard we articulated in
American-Arab I. Relying on the new evidence
of fundraising activity, the government
contends that a more relaxed First Amendment
inquiry is appropriate. Because activity, rather
than mere association, is at issue, the
government maintains that the case should be
analyzed under the standard set forth in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
Yet in American-Arab I we already
considered this question. We emphasized that
the government was required to show that the
Plaintiffs had the "specific intent" to engage in
illegal group aims because the Plaintiffs had
demonstrated that they were targeted for their
"associational activities with particular
disfavored groups." 70 F.3d at 1063. In
making this statement, we had before us
evidence that these associational activities
included fundraising. Thus, we already have
made it clear that targeting individuals because
of activities such as fundraising is
impermissible unless the government can show
that group members had the specific intent to
pursue illegal group goals.
O'Brien is inapplicable in a case such as this
one, in which the restrictions are in effect
content-based. Here, the central issue is
whether the government impermissibly
targeted the Plaintiffs due to their affiliation
with the PFLP, and did not so target aliens
affiliated with other foreign-dominated
organizations advocating violence and
destruction of property. Thus, the stringent
First Amendment standard articulated in
American-Arab I continues to apply.
Moreover, the government has not challenged
the factual finding made by the district court
that the INS targeted the Plaintiffs for their
mere association i.Ith the PFLP Indeed, in the
prior appeal the government conceded that
citizens would not have been treated in the
same fashion. Therefore, regardless of
whether the government has demonstrated that
the Plaintiffs were also targeted for fundraising
activity, the district court's conclusion that the
Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of
the government's improper motive is not
clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
IIRIRA does not eliminate federal jurisdiction
at this stage in the proceedings. We also
affirm the district court's decision denying the
government's motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction on behalf of the Six and
granting the preliminary injunction on behalf of
Hamide and Shebadeh.
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BUCKLEY v. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION
By Troy R. Rackham
Thirty-three states have a process under which the citizens of the state can directly place legislation
on the ballot. The process involves circulating copies of the proposed legislation to registered voters,
soliciting signatures from those registered voters who want to vote on the proposed legislation at the
general election, and then submitting the petitions with the appropriate amount of signatures to the state.
If a majority of the electorate approve of the legislation, then the initiative then becomes law. Of
course, each state which allows an initiative process like the one described has the authority to regulate
this "direct democracy" in order to prevent abuses of the system and fraud. At issue in Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation is the extent to which a state can regulate this process.
The specific issue presented to the Court is whether the state of Colorado may constitutionally regulate
the process of circulating initiative petitions by requiring that: (1) petition circulators who verify the
signatures of petition signers must be registered electors; (2) petition circulators must wear identification
badges; and (3) proponents of an initiative must file reports disclosing the amounts paid to circulators
and the identity of petition circulators.
The case arises out of Colorado's attempt to control the abuses committed by circulators in the
initiative process. In 1910, the citizens of Colorado amended the state constitution to allow the citizens
to pass laws and make changes to the Colorado Constitution through an initiative process. Since then,
the Colorado General Assembly has passed numerous measures aimed at controlling fraud and abuse in
the initiative process. The Colorado Constitution was even amended in 1980 in order reform the
initiative and referendum process. The most recent measure adopted by the Colorado General Assembly,
passed in 1993, added two requirements to the initiative process: (I) circulators must wear badges; and
(2) proponents of initiatives using paid circulators had to report the names and addresses of the
circulators, the proposed ballot measure the circulators are circulating, and how much the circulators
are being paid.
Various plaintiffs filed suit against these initiative regulations claiming, inter alia, that the regulations
interfered with their freedom of speech. The district court held that the badges provision was a
restriction on core speech protected by the First Amendment, and found that the badges provision was
unconstitutional because it was not the least restrictive means of furthering Colorado's compelling
interest of preventing fraud in the initiative process. The district court thrther held that the registration
requirement did not violate the Constitution. The court reasoned that because the U.S. Constitution
gives no mention of initiatives or referenda, states allowing such devices were free to restrict them as
they please. Finally, the district court struck down the reporting requirements because they were not
narrowly tailored to serve Colorado's compelling interests in the law,
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court as to the badges provision, holding that
requiring the circulators to wear badges was too broad an intrusion into the circulators' freedom of
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speech which discourages candor and controversial political speech. The Tenth Circuit also affirmed
the district court as to the reporting requirements. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that forcing the
disclosure of the circulators' identities and financial interests creates a chilling effect on paid circulation,
a constitutionally protected exercise. Finally, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court as to the
registration requirement. The Tenth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the registration requirements and
found that the registration requirements were not narrowly tailored to meet Colorado's compelling
interests in the law. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit held that the state could further the same interests by a
residency requirement, which is much less burdensome on the freedom of speech than the registration
requirement.
This case may have important implications for those thirty-three states which allow some sort of
initiative, referenda, or recall process, and perhaps even those states without such a process. For the first
time, the Court will have the opportunity to significantly define the role a state may take in regulating
its initiative, referenda, and recall process. If the Court affirms the Tenth Circuit, states may look for
different routes to take in order to prevent fraud. States may even decide that the costs of maintaining
an initiative process outweigh the benefits of it and forego initiatives altogether. If the Court reverses
the Tenth Circuit, states will be left with broad authority to regulate their own initiative process. Finally,
this case may likely appeal to the federalism sympathies of some of the justices. After all, the
Constitution mentions nothing about initiatives or referenda, and the traditional presumption is that if
the states are not expressly limited by the Constitution, then the states retain the power.
The states of Washington, Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, and South Dakota have all joined in an amicus brief supporting the petitioner
by arguing that the initiative process serves an essential function, but states must be left to regulate these
processes broadly. The thirteen-state coalition further argues that Colorado's regulations survive strict
scrutiny because they are the least intrusive means of regulation that will work to curb the abuses of the
initiative process.
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COURT AGREES TO REVIEW COLORADO BALLOT PETITION RULES
The Associated Press Political Service
February 23, 1998
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court, setting the stage for a significant ruling for ballot
initiatives, today agreed to review requirements Colorado once imposed on petitioning for such
measures.
The court voted to review lower courts' rulings that said the Colorado regulations, which supporters
claim are aimed at reducing the likelihood of fraud, violated free-speech and could not be enforced.
The justices left intact requirements that had been upheld by the courts - limiting petition drives to
six months and banning persons under 18 from collecting petition signatures.
More than half the states authorize voter-initiated ballot measures. The court's eventual ruling,
expected sometime in 1999, could contain important guidelines for those states.
In Nebraska, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in October ruled that a state law requiring that
petition circulators be registered voters was unconstitutional. The court ruled that the law
violated the First Amendment because it restricted political speech.
Colorado since 1913 has allowed voters to place certain initiatives on the state ballot. To get a
measure on the ballot, supporters must collect the signatures of at least 5 percent of the total votes cast
in the most recent secretary of state election. The state Legislature in I994 sought to limit the possibility
of fraud and to enhance public confidence in the initiative process by requiringz several additional
requirements:
*Circulators of ballot-initiative petitions had to be registered with the state and were required to
display identification badges disclosing whether they were paid or volunteer workers.
*Supporters of any initiative had to file monthly reports with the secretary of state and disclose the
names and addresses of all petition circulators.
A group of state residents and a public interest group, the American Constitutional Law Foundation,
sued to challenge the requirements. U.S. District Judge Richard Matsch struck down three of the four
requirements, and when state officials appealed the 10d' U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the
fourth as well.
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"A state has a strong, often compelling, interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral system,"
the appeals court said. But it added that Colorado had failed to justify the invalidated
requirements.
The cases are Buckley vs. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 97-930, and American
Constitutional Law Foundation vs. Buckley, 97-992.
Copyright 0 1998 The Associated Press.
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HIGH COURT TO REVIEW COLORADO'S PETITION LIMITS
The Rocky Mountain News (Denver, Co.)
February 24, 1998; Pg. 9A
Michael Romano; Rocky Mountain News Washington Bureau
The U.S. Supreme Court set the stage Monday for a ruling that could have a dramatic impact on
voter's rights, with a decision to review tough Colorado restrictions on petitioning for ballot issues. The
nation's highest court agreed to look at two lower-court rulings that invalidated a 1994 state law
supporters claimed would reduce the likelihood of fraud in ballot initiatives.
"I'm very happy they decided to review it, to look at it," said Colorado Secretary of State Victoria
Buckley. "Maybe some of the issues we're concerned with are finally going to be heard by the highest
court. It's a step in the right direction." Buckley said the law on petition circulators was passed, at least
in part, to ensure accountability. She said she wanted to be able to find them in case of any problems
with required signatures- at least 5 percent of the total votes cast in the most recent election for
secretary of state. "I believe they need to be registered," she said. "What we found is a lot of these paid
circulators coming in, causing problems in terms of our not being able to find them. My subpoena power
only goes to the borders of the state of Colorado." The law required petition circulators to be registered
with the state and forced them to display identification badges disclosing whether or not they were paid
to collect signatures. That provision and others- including a requirement that supporters of an initiative
file monthly reports with the secretary of state- was struck down by U.S, District Judge Richard
Matsch.
But the Supreme Court decided to review the decision by Matsch and a similar ruling by the 10th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton said the high court's decision
"could well be one of he more important First Amendment cases decided this decade."
Copyright W 1998 Denver Publishing Company.
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97-930 BUCKLEY v. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION INC.
Ruling below (American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc. v. Meyer, CA 10, 120 F.3d 1092):
Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 1-40-112(1), which requires that circulators of initiative and referendum
petitions be registered voters, discriminates against unregistered voters without being narrowly tailored
to ensure that circulators are residents. Moeover, Section 1-40-112(1) does not advance any other
compelling state interest, and thus violates First Amendment. Section 1-40-112(2), which requires each
circulator to wear personal identification badge, deprives circulators of anonymity without being
narrowly tailored to serve state's asserted interest in identifying and punishing fraud, and thus violates
First Amendment. Section 1-40-121(1), which requires proponents of initiative or referendum to file
monthly reports disclosing names of all paid circulators, and their address, county of voter registration,
and amounts paid, chills protected activity of paid circulation without being narrowly tailored to advance
state's asserted interests in informing electorate of whether measure has grassroots support and in
discouraging fraud, and thus violates First Amendment.
Question presented: May Colorado constitutionally regulate process of circulating initiative petitions
by requiring that: (1) petition circulators who verify signatures of petition signers must be registered
electors; (2) petition circulators must wear identification badges, and (3) proponents of
initiative must file reports disclosing amounts paid to circulators and identity of petition circulators?
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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION, INC., et al, Plaintiffs- Appellants,
V.
Natalie MEYER, individually and as Secretary of State for the State of
Colorado, et al, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
July 28, 1997
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action challenging portions of Senate Bill 93-
135, which regulates Colorado's initiative and
referendum petition process. Plaintiffs argued
S.B. 93-135 imposed restrictions that violated
their rights under the First, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Plaintiffs appeal the district
court's decision to uphold portions of S.B. 93-
135, and defendants appeal the court's decision
to strike down portions of S.B. 93-135. We
agree with the district court's decision in all
regards, except for its ruling upholding the
requirement set forth in C.R.S.A. 1-40-112(1)
that the circulator be a registered elector. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Colorado allows its citizens to place issues
on the ballot by petition. The petition process
consists of the initiative and the referendum.
A referendum is unavailable with respect to
laws "necessary for the immediate preservation
of the public peace, health, or safety." Under
the Colorado system, the general assembly has
exclusive authority to determine whether a law
is "necessary for the immediate preservation of
the public peace, health, or safety." Thus,
when the general assembly attaches a "safety
clause" to a law, a referendum on the law is
precluded, although the right of initiative
remains.
The Colorado Constitution grants the general
assembly the authority to adopt legislation
"designed to prevent fraud, mistake, or other
abuses" in the petition process. The manner in
which petitions may be circulated and by
whom, and how they may be signed and by
whom are regulated by C.R.S.A. §§ 1-40-101
et seq. Senate Bill 93-135 rearranged and
amended the article to "properly safeguard,
protect, and preserve inviolate" the people's
initiative and referendum power. C.R.S.A. § 1-
40-101.
Prior to circulation, proponents of a ballot
issue must submit a draft petition to the
directors of the legislative council and the
office of legal services for review and
comment. A public hearing is held within two
weeks of submission. Following the hearing,
the draft is presented to the title board, which
prepares a title, submission clause, and
summary. The proponents then have six
months to file the petition with the Secretary
of State. Unless the petition contains the
number of signatures required by the Colorado
Constitution, it is of no effect when filed.
Petition circulators collect the signatures and
sign affidavits in which they aver, among other
things, that each signer was a registered
elector and was not paid to sign the petition.
Circulators assume personal responsibility to
prevent irregularities in the process. If any
circulator is found to have violated any
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provision of the article, the section of the
petition circulated by that person "shall be
deemed void." C.R.S.A. § 1-40-132(1).
Plaintiff American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc., is a non-profit, public-
interest organization that supports direct
democracy. The remaining plaintiffs are
various individuals who, with the exception of
William David Orr (a minor who desires to
circulate petitions regarding educational
vouchers) and Bill Orr (a qualified but
unregistered elector), regularly participate in
the petition process as proponents and
circulators. At the time of trial, Jon Baraga
was circulating the Colorado Hemp Initiative
and was also the statewide petition
coordinator for the Hemp Initiative.
Along with several other plaintiffs, including
American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Baraga sought to repeal S.B. 93-135 by
referendum. Plaintiffs had agreed to devote
their resources in a joint effort, but the
Secretary of State informed them by letter that
a referendum on S.B. 93-135 was precluded
because it contained a safety clause.
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming various
portions of Article 40 violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments by restricting
circulation to six months, requiring all
circulators to sign an affidavit, restricting the
right to circulate by age and voter registration,
requiring all circulators to wear identification
badges, requiring proponents to disclose the
names of all paid circulators and the amounts
they were paid, and attaching a safety clause to
S.B. 93-135. The court struck down the
badge requirement and portions of the
disclosure requirement after concluding they
unduly burdened the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court rejected plaintiffs'
remaining claims.
11.
We turn to plaintiffs' First Amendment issues.
Plaintiffs argue the manner in which Colorado
regulates the petition process is subject to
exacting scrutiny because it significantly
burdens political speech. They rely heavily on
Meyer v. Grant (1988) in which proponents
challenged a Colorado law making it unlawful
to pay any consideration for the circulation of
initiative or referendum petitions. Meyer
acknowledged "circulation of a petition
involves the type of interactive communication
concerning political change that is
appropriately described as 'core political
speech.' " The Court applied exacting scrutiny
to strike down the challenged law, concluding
it restricted political expression by limiting the
number of voices conveying the proponents'
message and making it less likely the
proponents would gather the required number
of signatures to place their issue on the ballot.
Plaintiffs reason that because S.B. 93-135
restricts the manner in which citizens may
circulate petitions, the instant case is
indistinguishable from Meyer. They also cite
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley (1981), First Nat. Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti (1978), and Buckley v. Valeo (1976),
as controlling authority Each case, including
Meyer, involved restrictions on expenditures
to disseminate inflormation on political issues.
No such restrictions are involved here.
A successful petition results in a question
being submitted to the voters. Thus, the
petition process is a ballot access vehicle, as
well as an avenue for political expression.
Unlike plaintiffs, we do not read Meyer to
require that Colorado maintain a petition
process that, in essence, allows unregulated
access to the ballot. Indeed, such a reading
would conflict with the general rule that states
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have the power to regulate their elections and
access to their ballots.
"Common sense, as well as constitutional
law, compels the conclusion that government
must play an active role in structuring
elections." Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433 (1992). The Supreme Court has upheld
"generally-applicable and evenhanded
restrictions that protect the integrity of the
electoral process itself." Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n. 9 (1983). At
least one other circuit has extended similar
deference to regulations governing initiative
petitions. See Taxpayers United for
Assessment Cuts v. Austin (6th Cir. 1993).
Colorado has a strong interest in ensuring both
candidate elections and ballot issues are run
fairly, efficiently, and honestly.
To subject every petition regulation to
exacting scrutiny would tie Colorado's hands
in seeking to assure equitable and efficient
elections on ballot issues. Timmons discussed
a flexible standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of laws regulating the
electoral process:
When deciding whether a state election law
violates First and Fourteenth Amendment
associational rights, this Court must weigh
the character and magnitude of the burden
the State's rule imposes on those rights
against the interests the State contends
justify that burden, and consider the extent
to which the State's concerns make the
burden necessary. Regulations imposing
severe burdens must be narrowly tailored
and advance a compelling state interest.
Lesser burdens, however, trigger less
exacting review, and a State's important
regulatory interests will usually be enough to
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.
Thus, the rigorousness of our inquiry depends
upon the extent to which the challenged law
burdens plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
Plaintiffs challenge five restrictions--(1) the
C.R.S.A. § 1-40-108(1) requirement that
proponents file a petition with the secretary of
state within six months of the date that the
titles, submission clause, and summary have
been fixed; (2) the C.R.S.A. § 1-40-111(2)
requirement that circulators sign affidavits
averring, essentially, that they have complied
with Colorado law, (3) the C.R.S.A. § 1-40-
112(1) restriction allowing petitions to be
circulated only by registered electors at least
eighteen years old, (4) the C.R.S.A. § 1-40-
112(2) requirement that all circulators wear
badges identifying themselves by name and as
either paid or volunteer; and (5) the C.R.S.A.
§ 1-40-112(1) and (2) disclosure requirement
regarding paid circulators.
C.R.S.A. § 1-40-108(l) provides, in part,
that "[n]o petition for any ballot issue shall be
of any effect unless filed with the secretary of
state within six months from the date that the
title, submission clause, and summary have
been fixed and determined." The gist of
plaintiffs' argument is that the six-month limit
is arbitrary and excludes some measures from
being placed on the ballot. Defendants argue
the deadline is necessary to preserve an orderly
ballot and, in any case, is not as onerous as
other limits approved by the Supreme Court.
The six-month deadline is a neutral ballot
access regulation. By definition, ballot access
restrictions prevent some measures from being
placed on the ballot. However, this feature is
insufficient by itself to require strict scrutiny.
The court found, and the record indicates,
that by planning and proper preparation of the
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ballot, title proponents enjoy ample time to
circulate petitions.
Although some measures might fare better
under a longer or indeterminate period, the
current deadline is not a significant burden on
the ability of organized proponents to place a
measure on the ballot. "[T]he State's asserted
regulatory interests [need only be] 'sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation' imposed on
the [Plaintiffs'] rights." Timmons, 117 S.Ct. at
1366. Our inquiry does not require
"[e]laborate, empirical verification of
weightiness" of the State's asserted
justifications. Id. Defendants assert several
interests: preserving the integrity of the state's
elections, maintaining an orderly ballot, and
limiting voter confusion. The regulation here
advances these interests by establishing a
reasonable window in which proponents must
demonstrate support for their causes. The six-
month deadline is a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory ballot access regulation, it
does not offend the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
C.R.S.A. § 1-40-111(2) requires circulators
to sign specifically described affidavits and is
"generally-applicable." [quotation omitted,
eds.]
A state has a strong, often compelling,
interest in preserving the integrity of its
electoral system. Circulators play an
important role in ballot issue elections--they
are solely responsible for gathering the number
and type of signatures required to place an
issue on the ballot. Indeed, as we have
previously noted, circulators are, in effect,
entrusted with personal responsibility to
prevent irregularities in the petition process.
The affidavits "ensure that circulators, who
possess various degrees of interest in a
particular initiative, exercise special care to
prevent mistake, friaud, or abuse in the process
of obtaining thousands of signatures of only
registered electors throughout the state."
Loonan, 882 P.2d at 1388-89. Given the
responsibility circulators bear in ensuring the
integrity of elections involving ballot issues,
and given the fact that the affidavit
requirement is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restriction, we conclude plaintiffs' challenge
fails.
Section 1-40-112(1) prescribes who may
circulate: "No section of a petition for any
initiative or referendum measure shall be
circulated by any person who is not a
registered elector and at least eighteen years of
age at the time the section is circulated." The
district court held 1-40-112(1) was
unreviewable because the petition process is
not a right granted by the United States
Constitution. In Meyer, we rejected that
argument, explaining even though the initiative
and referendum process is not guaranteed by
the United States Constitution, Colorado's
choice to reserve it does not leave the state
free to condition its use by impermissible
restraints on First Amendment activity.
Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the statutory
restriction is based upon a constitutional
provision enacted by petition. The voters may
no more violate the United States Constitution
by enacting a ballot issue than the general
assembly may by enacting legislation.
Plaintiffs argue, essentially, that 1-40-112(1)
is discriminatory. Under an equal protection
analysis, classifications that impinge upon the
exercise of a fundamental right are subject to
the most exacting scrutiny. Plaintiffs do not
bring an equal protection claim, nevertheless,
when a statute allows some people to speak
but not others, the principles of equal
protection and free speech are intertwined.
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The registration requirement has a
discriminatory effect. It bars persons who are
not registered voters from circulating petitions,
thereby excluding that group of persons from
participating in core political speech.
Colorado acknowledges there are at least
400,000 qualified but unregistered voters in
the state. The mandatory exclusion of
unregistered circulators also limits the number
of voices to convey the proponent's message,
limiting the audience the proponents can reach
and making it less likely they will be able to
gather the required number of signatures to
place a measure on the ballot. Consequently,
we apply exacting scrutiny.
Colorado fails to identify a compelling state
interest to which its registration requirement is
narrowly tailored. The state attempts to justify
the registration requirement by arguing it has
a compelling interest in ensuring circulators
are residents so the regulatory system may be
more easily policed (the secretary's authority
to issue subpoenas to circulators does not
extend beyond Colorado's borders) and
circulators who violate the law may be more
easily prosecuted. Even if we assume the
state's potentially compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its elections requires
all circulators to be residents, a question we
need not decide, the registration requirement
is not narrowly tailored to ensure that
circulators are residents. Clearly, a large
number of Colorado residents are not
registered voters. The state's asserted interest
could be more precisely achieved by simply
imposing a residency requirement for
circulators. Because Colorado's requirement
that circulators be registered voters is not
narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest, we find it unconstitutionally impinges
on free expression and reverse the district
court.
Section 1-40-112(1) also places an age
restriction on circulation. We are mindful that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is fbi adults alone." In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). We also recognize,
however, that age commonly is used as a
proxy for maturity. Subject to the Twenty-
sixth Amendment, it seems states generally
may place an age requirement on the right to
vote without having to satisfy exacting
scrutiny. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
persons under eighteen have a stronger interest
in circulating than they do in voting. The age
requirement is a neutral restriction that
imposes only a temporary disability- it does
not establish an absolute prohibition but
merely postpones the opportunity to circulate.
Exacting scrutiny is not required. Because
maturity is reasonably related to Colorado's
interest in preserving the integrity of ballot
issue elections, plaintiffs' First Amendment
challenge fails.
Section 1-40-1 12(2) requires each circulator
to wear a personal identification badge:
"(a) All circulators who are not to be paid
for circulating petitions concerning ballot
issues shall display an identification badge
that includes the words "VOLUNTEER
CIRCULATOR" in bold-faced type which is
clearly legible and the circulator's name.
(b) All circulators who are to be paid for
circulating petitions concerning ballot issues
shall display an identification badge that
includes the words "PAID CIRCULATOR"
in bold-faced type which is clearly legible,
the circulator's name, and the name and
telephone number of the individual
employing the circulator."
A violation of 1-40-1 12(2) could result in
the signatures collected by a circulator being
declared void, C.R.S.A. 1-40-132, and
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possibly even criminal prosecution, C.R.S.A.
1-40-130(2). The district court held that 1-
40-112(2) infringes the right to anonymous
political expression and struck it down in its
entirety. The court found the badge
requirement discourages people from
circulating because people are reluctant to
wear badges, especially when they advocate
unpopular causes.
Defendants attempt to avoid exacting
scrutiny. First, they argue the badge
requirement has been upheld by the Supreme
Court, citing footnotes from Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487
U.S. 781, 799 n. 11 (1988), and Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 n. 14 (1943).
Riley invalidated a North Carolina law
restricting the manner in which professional
fundraisers could solicit charitable
contributions, and Martin invalidated a city
ordinance prohibiting knocking on the door or
ringing the doorbell of any residence for the
purpose of distributing literature. Neither case
addressed a law similar to 1-40-112(2) and
neither held that a state may condition political
expression on the wearing of an identification
badge. Further, the footnotes on which
defendants rely are dicta.
Second, defendants argue exacting scrutiny
is unwarranted because there is no
constitutionally protected right to circulate
anonymously. However, "[t]he First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to
... political expression in order '[t]o assure
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.'" Buckley, 424 U.S. at
14. It is also clear that circulation is core
political expression. The Supreme Court has
protected anonymous political expression and
association. The Court protects anonymity
because "fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance." Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. As the
Court has explained, our nation's tradition of
anonymous political expression "is perhaps
best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-
won right to vote one's conscience without
fear of retaliation " McIntyre, 514 U.S. at
342.
On the other hand, the Court also has upheld
disclosure requirements that deprive some
speakers of anonymity. Although exhaustive,
the disclosures examined in Buckley are not
akin to the identification badges at issue here.
The disclosures in Buckley were limited to
candidate elections, were triggered only where
the speaker spent money, and were further
removed from the moment of speech. Even in
Buckley, however, the Court acknowledged
that "significant encroachments on First
Amendment rights of the sort that compelled
disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a
mere showing of some legitimate
governmental interest." Buckley, 424 U.S. at
64. Thus, the Court subjected the disclosure
requirements to exacting scrutiny. To the
extent defendants attempt to avoid exacting
scrutiny, their second argument is
unpersuasive.
Third, defendants argue circulators have only
a diminished interest in anonymity because
they sign affidavits that are attached to the
petition, which is available to the public.
Information contained on an identification
badge is much more accessible than
information attached to a filed petition and,
unlike the affidavit requirement, the badge
requirement forces circulators to reveal their
identities at the same time they deliver their
political message. The badge requirement
operates when the reaction to their message
may be the most intense, emotional, and
unreasoned. Thus, as opposed to the affidavit
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requirement, the badge requirement deprives
circulators of their anonymity at the precise
moment their interest in anonymity is greatest.
The record amply supports the court's finding
that the badge requirement chills circulation.
It places a "severe" restriction on First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights requiring
exacting scrutiny.
Defendants argue the badge requirement
serves a compelling interest, aiding the state's
efforts to prevent fraud by enabling the public
to identify individuals who make false or
fraudulent statements while circulating. Thus,
defendants essentially argue the badges enable
the state to pursue more efficiently individuals
who engage in misconduct. Although the state
has a compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of its elections, "the First Amendment
does not permit the State to sacrifice speech
for efficiency," Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
Additionally, "the risk of fraud or corruption,
or the appearance thereof, is more remote at
the petition stage of an initiative than at the
time of balloting." Meyer, 486 U.S. at 427,
Therefore, "[a]lthough the State has every
right to take strong measures to prevent ...
dishonest activities by petition circulators, the
State may do so only by measures tailored to
attack those problems within clearly
recognized areas permitted by the Supreme
Court." Grant, 828 F.2d at 1454.
Circulating a petition is akin to distributing
a handbill. In both instances, an individual
identifies himself or herself with a specific
viewpoint by personally disseminating it. Just
as those who distribute handbills have a strong
interest in remaining anonymous, so do
circulators. [Quotation omitted, eds.]
Defendants argue the badge requirement is
the type of "limited identification requirement"
McIntyre suggested might be constitutional.
Defendants rely on Buckley, which upheld
compelled disclosure of certain expenditures
and their uses in candidate elections.
Requiring circulators to identify themselves
against their will is more intrusive than simply
disclosing an expenditure. Whereas
contributing to a campaign is only a
generalized demonstration of support,
circulating a petition, and the advocacy it
entails, more clearly identifies the circulator
with the precisely defined point of view he or
she is personally encouraging others to
support. Spending money to advance an
unpopular viewpoint is a more detached form
of support and is less likely to precipitate
retaliation than circulating a petition.
As previously noted, defendants argue the
badge requirement is necessary to enable the
state to identify and punish fraud. Section 1-
40-112(2) is not narrowly tailored to serve the
state's asserted interest. Conditioning
circulation upon wearing an identification
badge is a broad intrusion, discouraging
truthful, accurate speech by those unwilling to
wear a badge, and applying regardless of the
character or strength of an individual's interest
in anonymity. Additionally, the badges are but
one part of the state's comprehensive scheme
to combat circulation fraud. Article 40
provides other tools that are much more
narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest.
Although requiring circulators to wear
identification badges may enhance the state's
ability to impose other penalties, it does not
follow, and it is unestablished, that the badges
are a necessary component of the state's
arsenal.
Because we find the badge requirement
unconstitutionally infi-inges on circulators' First
Amendment rights by its identification
requirements, and because plaintiffs' arguments
and evidence focus entirely on this element of
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the badge requirement, we express no opinion
regarding whether the additional requirements
that the badge disclose whether the circulator
is paid or a volunteer, and if paid, by whom,
would pass constitutional muster standing
alone.
Section 1-40-121 places disclosure
requirements on paid circulators and is
"generally-applicable." [Quotation ommitted,
eds.]
The court invalidated 1-40-121(1) to the
extent it requires the proponents of a petition
to provide "the name, address, and county of
voter registration of all circulators who were
paid to circulate any section of the petition" in
reporting the amounts paid to circulators. The
court invalidated 1-40-121(2) in its entirety.
We apply exacting scrutiny.
Section 1-40-121 is a broad disclosure
provision. It compels disclosure of the name
of a paid circulator regardless of the amount
he or she received to circulate. The State
analogizes 1-40-121 to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 disclosure provision
upheld in Buckley. Buckley acknowledged
that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can
seriously infringe on privacy of association and
belief guaranteed by the First Amendment."
Id. at 64. However, Buckley identified three
interests "sufficiently important to outweigh"
the infringement on the "privacy of association
and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment." Id. at 64. First, campaign
finance disclosure informs voters of the
candidate's place in the political spectrum and
alerts them "to the interests to which a
candidate is most likely to be responsive." Id.
at 67. Second, "disclosure requirements deter
actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption." Id. Third, "disclosure
requirements are an essential means of
gathering the data necessary to detect
violations of the contribution limitations." Id.
at 68.
Unlike the statute in Buckley, 1-40-121
imposes no monetary threshold-- a circulator
must be identified by name and address
regardless of whether he or she received 10
cents or $10,000. The statutes at issue in
Buckley and Brown are dissimilar from 1-40-
121 for another reason- they regulate
candidate elections but 1-40- 121 does not.
Section 1-40-121 applies only to the
circulation of initiative and referendum
petitions. None of the three interests the
Court found sutlicient in Buckley are relevant
here. The first and third are inapplicable
because 1-40-12 1 addresses expenditures, not
contributions. The second is inapplicable
because "quid pro quo" concerns are not
present here. Defendants' attempts to
analogize 1-40-121 to Buckley are
unpersuasive.
The court struck down 1-40-121(1) to the
extent it compels disclosure of information
specific to each paid circulator. Much like
requiring identification badges, compelling the
disclosure of the identities of every paid
circulator chills paid circulation, a
constitutionally protected exercise. Although
the fact that disclosure is made at the time the
proponents file the petition lessens the burden
of the disclosure, the law fails exacting
scrutiny because the interests asserted by the
state either already are or can be protected by
less intrusive measures.
Defendants' first asserted interest, informing
the electorate whether a measure has
grassroots support, is directly and specifically
protected by the constitutional requirement
that to reach the ballot an initiative or
referendum petition must be signed "by
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registered electors in an amount equal to at
least five percent of the total number of votes
cast for all candidates for the office of
secretary of state at the previous general
election." Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(2) & (3).
As limited by the court, 1-40-121(1) requires
proponents to disclose the amount spent per
signature and, thus, the total amount paid to
circulators. To the extent the amount of
money spent has some correlation to the level
of grassroots support, this information allows
voters to compare the level of support enjoyed
by different issues. Requiring proponents to
provide a detailed roster of all who were paid
to circulate compromises the expressive rights
of paid circulators, but sheds little light on the
relative merit of the ballot issue.
Defendants' second asserted interest,
discouraging fraud, also is protected by a
battery of more narrowly tailored measures.
The State has made no showing that these
mechanisms are inadequate. Defendants have
not shown the disclosure is necessary to
discourage fraud.
Section 1-40-121(2) compels detailed
monthly disclosures. The court invalidated it
in its entirety. Defendants assert the same two
interests: grassroots support and fraud.
Compelling detailed monthly disclosures while
the petition is being circulated chills speech by
forcing paid circulators to surrender the
anonymity enjoyed by their volunteer
counterparts. In that the disclosures are
contemporaneous with circulation, 1-40-
121(2) is more akin to the badge requirement
than 1-40-121(1). Section 1-40-121(2) is a
broad intrusion only loosely related to the
interests it is purported to serve. Like 121(1),
121(2) fails exacting scrutiny because it is not
narrowly tailored to serve either of defendants'
asserted interests.
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CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICTv. GARRET F.
By Troy R. Rackham
Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) require schools to pay for services
provided to disabled individuals who need the one-on-one continuous service of a nurse in order to
attend school? This is the question presented to the Supreme Court by Cecar Rapids Community School
District v. Garret F.
Garret F. was severely injured in a motorcycle accident when he was 4. He is now a quadriplegic and
depends on a ventilator to breathe. Despite his physical setbacks, Garret's mental abilities were
unaffected and he is now in high school. However, Garret requires the continuous medical attention of
a nurse at school. Specifically, Garret requires urinary bladder catheterization once a day, suctioning
of his tracheotomy as needed, food and drink on a regular schedule, ambu bag administration,
observation for respiratory distress, blood pressure monitoring, and bowel disimpactation in cases of
autonomic hyperreflexia.
Obviously the cost of providing a nurse on a daily basis to perform these services is extensive. Garret's
parents initially footed the bill for the nurse attendant. However, when Garret reached fifth grade, the
parents could no longer afford to provide the nurse and asked the school to do so under the IDEA. The
school refused, claiming that it was not obligated under the IDEA to provide for continuous nursing
service.
Garret's mother, Charlene, challenged the school's position by appealing to an administrative law
judge. The ALJ found that the IDEA expressly excluded 'medical services' fiom the obligations imposed
upon schools. Notwithstanding the 'medical services' exception, the AL determined that the school was
required to pay for the nursing services given to Garret F because continuous nursing service is not a
medical service. The school appealed the ALJ's decision to the federal district court. The district court
affirmed the ALJ's decision by granting Garret's motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro (1984),
found that the IDEA's medical services exception was meant to apply only to services provided by a
physician and not a nurse. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held
that the school is required to provide the nursing services to Garret F
The Supreme granted certiorari to this case to resolve a circuit split. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits have previously held that the IDEA's 'medical services' exception applies to other medical
services, like providing a nurse in school. The Eighth circuit split from these circuits in Garret F. by
holding that nursing services are not excluded by the IDEA.
An affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's opinion could have enormous ramifications for the many schools
who are already short on resources. Schools may have to provide nursing and other related services to
all disabled individuals in need. The financial and logistical impact of this type of holding upon schools
will obviously be great.
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COURT TO DECIDE SCHOOL-NURSES CASE
AP Online
May 18, 1998
Richard Carelli
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme Court today agreed to decide whether public school districts
must pay for professional nurses to accompany some disabled students throughout the school day.
The justices said they will review rulings that require a Cedar Rapids, Iowa, school district to pay for
nursing services needed by a teen-age boy identified in court papers as Garret F.
At issue is the scope of the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The law provides that
all children with disabilities receive a "free appropriate public education."
Under the law, public schools are required to provide various "special education and related services."
But an exception is made for medical services.
Asked by the court for its views, the Clinton administration had urged the justices to reject the school
officials' appeal and leave the lower court rulings intact.
Garret, injured in a motorcycle accident at age 4, is a quadriplegic and ventilator dependent. His
mental abilities were unaffected, and he is now in the ninth grade.
During the school day, he requires a personal attendant to see to his health-care needs. Through most
of his schooling, a licensed practical nurse has served as that attendant
In 1993, Garret's mother asked the school district to pick up the costs of providing an attendant for
Garret.
She said such costs are to be free "related services" provided under the federal law. But school
officials said one-on-one nursing services are medical, not educational, and do not have to be provided
at taxpayer expense.
A federal trial judge and the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for Garret and against the school
district.
"Garret's services are not provided by a physician but rather a nurse," the appeals court said last
December. "Thus ... the services are not medical services but rather school health services or supportive
services, both of which meet the definition of related services which the district must provide."
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The appeals court relied heavily on a 1984 Supreme Court ruling that said public school officials had
to pay for and provide a special procedure for a child disabled by spina bifida and unable to urinate by
herself
Such services, the high school said then, "are no less related to the effort to educate than are services
that enable the child to reach, enter or exit the school."
But that 1984 opinion added: "It bears mentioning that not even the services of a nurse are required."
In the appeal acted on today, lawyers for the Cedar Rapids school officials noted that three other
federal appeals courts have ruled that schools don't have to pay for continuous services provided by
licensed nurses.
"Medical services are not provided only by physicians," the appeal said. "The court of appeals
effectively converted the (federal law) from an educational law to a law requiring school districts to pay
catastrophic medical expenses of their students."
Lawyers for the boy and his mother urged the justices to reject the school district's appeal, contending
that the disputed costs were minimal when the revenue generated by Garret's attendance is taken into
consideration.
The case is Cedar Rapids Community School District vs. Garret F., 96-1793.
Copyright 0 1998 The Associated Press.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW SOUGHT IN HEALTH CARE RULING
The Special Educator
March 28, 1997
Vol. 12, No. 16
The Board of Education in the Cedar Rapids Community School District has decided to ask the U.S.
Supreme Court to review the recent 8th Circuit ruling in which the court ignored several factors
generally used to determine health care services requirements in granting those services to a medically
fragile student.
In Cedar Rapids Community Sch. District v. Garret F., 25 IDELR 439, the court said it was bound
by the "bright-line" physician/nonphysician rule in the Supreme Court's Tatro case: The services of a
physician (other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the medical services
exclusion, but services that can be provided in the school setting by a nurse or qualified layperson are
not.
Since the services in question for a 12-year-old quadriplegic (urinary bladder catheterization,
suctioning of tracheostomy, ventilator setting checks, ambu bag administrations as a backup to the
ventilator, blood pressure monitoring, observation to determine if he was in respiratory distress or
autonomic hyperreflexia, and disempactation in the event of autonomic hyperreflexia) did not need to
be administered by a doctor, the court said they were school health services or supportive services which
the district must provide.
Jeananne Hagen, Iowa's special education director, said the state was just beginning to analyze the
potential impact of the ruling, and specifically how many districts are already providing such services.
Other courts have weighed several factors in determining whether health care services are required
related services or excludable medical services. Those factors have included the level of expertise
necessary to administer the services, whether the student's condition is life-threatening, and the financial
burdens of providing the services.
Copyright 0 1997 LRP Publications.
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96-1793 CEDAR RAPIIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GARRET F.
(Ruling Below 106 F.3d 822 (8 h Cir. 1996))
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act's exclusion of'medical services' beyond those for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes from statute's funding of special education and related services, 20
USC 1401(a)(17), is limited, under Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tiro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), to
services of physician other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes, and thus quadriplegic
fifth grader was entitled to funding for nurse's services necessary to enable him to enjoy
benefit of special education.
Questions presented: (1) Is school district required to pay for continuous one-on- one nursing
services for disabled student, when IDEA expressly excludes 'medical services' from its mandate? (2)
Should there be bright-line rule that IDEA's exclusion of'medical services' means only those services
provided by physician, as determined below by Eighth Circuit, or are other medical services excluded
from statute, as previously determined by Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits?
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CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant,
V.
GARRET F., A minor by his Mother and Next friend, CHARLENE F., Appellee.
No. 96-1987 NICR.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Decided Feb. 7, 1997.
STROM, Senior District Judge.
This case arises under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§
1400--1491o. At issue is whether the IDEA
requires the Cedar Rapids Community School
District to provide Garret F. with continuous
nursing services while he is in school. The
district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Garret finding that the necessary
services were not within the "medical services"
exclusion of the IDEA, and therefore, were
"related services" which the school district
must provide.
FACTS
In 1987, when he was four years old, Garret
was severely injured in a tragic motorcycle
accident. While Garret's mental abilities were
unaffected, his spinal cord injury left him a
quadriplegic and ventilator dependant.
In the fall of 1988, Garret started kindergarten
in the Cedar Rapids Community School
District. He has been in school there ever
since. During the school day, Garret requires
a personal attendant within hearing distance of
him at all times to see to his health care needs.
Garret requires urinary bladder catheterization
about once a day, suctioning of his
tracheotomy as needed, food and drink on a
regular schedule, repositioning, ambu bag
administration if the ventilator malfunctions,
ventilator setting checks, observation for
respiratory distress or autonomic
hyperreflexia, blood pressure monitoring, and
bowel disimpactation in cases of autonomic
hyperreflexia. From kindergarten through the
fourth grade, pursuant to an agreement
between Garret's parents and the school
district, Garret's family provided the personal
attendant.
However, in I993, when Garret started fifth
grade, the agreement between his parents and
the school district was discontinued. Garret's
mother, Charlene F., requested that the school
district provide Garret's nursing services while
he was at school. The school district refused
stating that it was not obligated to provide
continuous, one-on-one nursing services.
Relying on the IDEA and the Iowa special
education laws, Charlene administratively
challenged the school district's position. After
a hearing, the administrative law judge
concluded that the school district had to
reimburse Charlene for the nursing costs she
incurred during the 1993-94 school year and
had to provide such services in the future. The
school district appealed to United States
District Court.
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In district court, both parties filed motions
for summary judgment based on the record
from the administrative hearing. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of Garret
finding that the services were not within the
scope of the "medical services" exclusion of
the IDEA, and therefore, the school district
was required to provide them as "related
services." The school district appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court will review the district court's
interpretation of the applicable federal statutes
de novo on appeal.
DISCUSSION
In order to receive funds under the IDEA, a
state must demonstrate to the Secretary of
Education that it has "in effect a policy that
assures all children with disabilities the right to
a free appropriate public education." 20
U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp.1996). The phrase
"free appropriate public education" is defined
as special education and related services. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1990). Thus, if Garret's
nursing services qualify as "related services,"
the school district must provide them.
Related services are statutorily defined as:
transportation, and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services
(including speech pathology and audiology,
psychological services, physical and
occupational therapy, recreation, including
therapeutic recreation, social work services,
counseling services, including rehabilitation
counseling, and medical services, except that
such medical services shall be for diagnostic
and valuation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a child with a disability to
benefit from special education, and includes
the early identification and assessment of
disabling conditions in children.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (Supp.1996). Garret
contends that his nursing services qualify as
related services, but the school district argues
that the services are "medical services" which
are expressly excluded from the definition of
supportive services and consequently the
definition of related services.
This court's decision is controlled by the two
step test pronounced by the Supreme Court in
Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S.
883 (1984). To determine if a service is a
related service under the IDEA, the court must
first determine whether the service is a
"supportive service[ ] .. required to assist a
child with a disability to benefit from special
education." 20 U.S.C § 1401(17) (1990). If
it is, then the court must determine if the
service is excluded from the definition of
supportive service as a medical service beyond
diagnosis or evaluation.
There is little argument about whether the
services Garret requires qualify as supportive
services necessary to enable him to enjoy the
benefit of special education. If the services are
not available during the school day, Garret
cannot attend school and thereby benefit from
special education. "Services ... that permit a
child to remain at school during the day are no
less related to the effort to educate than are
services that enable the child to reach, enter,
or exit the building" which are expressly
provided for in the IDEA. Thus, the court
finds that the services Garret requires at school
are supportive services.
At the second step, the court must determine
whether the services are excluded from the
definition of supportive services as medical
services beyond diagnosis and evaluation. In
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Tatro, the Supreme Court established a bright-
line test: the services of a physician (other
than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes)
are subject to the medical services exclusion,
but services that can be provided in the school
setting by a nurse or qualified layperson are
not. Regardless of whether we agree with this
reading of the statute and the regulations, we
are bound by the Supreme Court's holding.
Here, Garret's services are not provided by
a physician, but rather, a nurse. Thus, based
on Tatro, the services are not medical services,
but rather, school health services or supportive
services, both of which meet the definition of
related services which the district must
provide.
The court is aware of several decisions that
have not interpreted Tatro as establishing a
bright-line, physician/non-physician test for
medical services. Going beyond the
physician/non-physician distinction the
Supreme Court found in the statute and the
regulations, these courts rely on dicta in Tatro
in order to factor into the medical services
exclusion considerations of the nature and
extent of the services performed. The court
declines to seize dicta in Tatro to go beyond
the physician/non-physician test which the
Supreme Court sets forth therein.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
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